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

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

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

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CONFIDENTIAL

9 Mar 1945

Mr. Alfred W. Tozzer
[illegible] Bishop Street
[illegible]olulu 1, T. H.

Dear Mr. Tozzer:

Thank you very much for your letter, together with your study, PROGRAMS OF JAPAN IN MANCHUKUO. I appreciate very much the immediate attention you have given to this and I know it is going to be a great help to you in doing the job which, I understand, we will be authorized to do within a short time.

I hope to see you next year very soon again.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Japan

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

HONOLULU OFFICE

TELEPHONE 3824

2 May 1945

General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

If you will remember, when you were here on your flying-in-very-fresh trip, among your suggestions was one that we "do" an Assemblage on Manchukuo.

This request coincided with one from the R&A office where they are working on certain chapters in a JACIC study on the same area.

The enclosed study, PROBLEMS OF JAPAN IN MANCHUKUO, the direct result of your suggestion, we take pleasure in sending you.

Twenty copies, together with the appendix, are being forwarded to the R&A office in Washington.

I have seen Mrs. Masterson twice during the last week and she, too, regrets she didn't see you.

Very sincerely yours,

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Japan 15265

SECRET

X OSS SPS CINCPOA

X Australia

X Radio Tokyo

29 September 1944

Mr. Alfred M. Tesser
Castle & Cooke Building
Bishop and Merchant Streets
Honolulu, T. H.

Dear Mr. Tesser:

General Donovan has asked me to drop you this line of thanks for your letter to him of 8 September 1944, and the attached copy of Volume #1 of Selected Notes on Japanese Strategic Objectives.

R. G. Jones
Major, AUS

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6 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Planning Group

FROM: Lt. Colonel Carl C. Hoffman

THRU: Lt. Colonel Edward L. Bigelow
Deputy Director - MPD

SUBJECT: Japan's Possible Surrender

Within the last month there was considerable planning as what CCS activities, if any, should take place in Germany as the Allied armies advance. This planning became somewhat difficult because of the necessity of considering at the same time what should be done if Germany surrenders.

To avoid hasty consideration of similar problems respecting Japan, I offer for consideration of the Planning Group the following:

No country ever had more certain knowledge of her opponent's superiority than Japan had of Allied superiority.

Japan had a senior partner, to wit, Germany who was thought invincible until some five months ago. Now the Allies are their first bomb load in Formosa there was still a great doubt in Japan's mind whether or not Germany could be beaten, but with devastating speed that an Axis were crushed by a blitz that dwarfed the blitz which caused Japan to so greatly admire Germany.

Japan knows we have superiority of the sea.

Japan knows there is no doubt of our having superiority of the air since twelve are sitting here for evidence of that record will be obtained the day we ask to look at the playgrounds made in the Pacific and the making at will of any objectives.

The economy and productivity of the Allies is so strong and large that it must be overwhelming to the Japanese.

Russia has not yet declared war on Japan, but in all probability will after Germany falls.

Japan knows that the American people has been educated in the principle of unconditional surrender of her opponent (as there is little logic that the nation will back away from that policy). Japan knows [illegible] by heart of about twenty soldiers and will try not to maintain the Japanese [illegible] and there is no doubt about the Allies' ability to do it.

Regarding the page of the [illegible] it appears that [illegible] because of [illegible] the fact is not for a [illegible] and [illegible]

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

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

17,995
Japan
Source Sass

TO : Brig. Gen. W. J. Donovan
Col. G. E. Burton

FROM : Lt. Col. H. W. Dix

DATE: 7 August 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Japan
Source Sass

O'Connor

Attached is photostatic copy of excerpts from a report on Japan sent in by Colonel O'Connor. The source is one which has been arranged by Colonel O'Connor.

Encl.: Index
pages 9-18
19-26
47-52

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Civilian Morale:

The burial ashes, or some personal article belonging to every deceased soldier is sent home in a white bag to his family. So many funerals are being held that proper and full-length ritual and mourning services cannot be given. As many as 5 or 6 trams per day have been observed in [redacted], filled with soldiers carrying these white bags. They are taken first to the shrines and then to the deceased soldier's home, where they are kept. There is no sign of much sorrow. People take news of death without much emotion.

On April or May, 1943, there was a severe earthquake in the [redacted] area. This was vaguely reported in the press. An official statement claimed that 2,000 houses in [redacted] were destroyed, but gave no additional information. No one was permitted to go to the [redacted] area. It was a lateral earthquake, but with some vertical movement. Tremors were felt in [redacted], although the epicenter was in [redacted].

Earthquake shocks were felt much more often in 1943 than for many years. Preceding the [redacted] main shocks occurred practically every day for a while.

Cyclones and typhoons were of the same severity as usual.

The summer of 1943 was the hottest in thirty years. There was high humidity and temperature. People suffered from body pimples, and the asphalt of streets melted. The summer was preceded by a very short rainy season, lasting only to the beginning of July. (The rainy season usually lasts until 15 July.) There was, however, no serious effect on the food situation. Rice production was not affected because of the relatively heavy moisture deposited during the shortened rainy season. Evidence of the intense heat during the summer was observed at [redacted] Beach, where many people were carried from the beaches after fainting from exhaustion.

Summer conditions were made more difficult by the fact that air conditioning is banned and department stores have been stopped by the government and that civilians are not permitted to use electric current for household refrigerators.

The winter of 1943-1944 was mild enough to affect working conditions in the early morning hours before the temperature could be brought up according to modern temperature. The amount of snow was greater than usual. However, that may have been the reason for the improved conditions of the winter.

[redacted]

Japanese opposition to the war [redacted] from the commercial [redacted], many of whom [redacted] operating and supporting [redacted] the war, and who now [redacted] because almost all trade was [redacted] Japan is more afraid than [redacted] when the war [redacted] would continue for [redacted] because the Japanese government will [redacted] through the [redacted] the official government [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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[illegible] the [illegible] of the Japanese Diet are done solemnly [illegible] such request notes, especially under the surveillance of the [illegible] Department, the [illegible] of the families of the commercial class [illegible] will.

[illegible], to be [illegible], was in [illegible] the influence of the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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between Japan and America. While she, and although they want Japan to

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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The public can listen only to long wave radio broadcasts, short wave being forbidden. FUKUOKA, the PHILIPPINES, and SHANGHAI are the furthest points which can be heard on the Japanese-made radio apparatus. Local stations, of course, can be heard easily. As far as the radios themselves are concerned, there are no good radio tubes obtainable for replacement; Japanese-made radio tubes are very scarce. [illegible] radios, used by a few people, are being operated with old tubes.

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

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[illegible]

There are no cripples or beggars in the streets of Japan at present. [illegible] one way or the other. Cripples are forced to work [illegible] very badly [illegible] work in poor conditions. They live in the filthiest houses, and cannot even afford to go to the public [illegible] as a whole are very dirty, and do not wash their clothes.

[illegible] are not many old people employed, but a considerable number [illegible] are being used in industry, even down to the age of [illegible] necessary before the war. There is no law pre- [illegible] in factories. In one factory [illegible] there were [illegible] available, [illegible] such as elevating pumps [illegible] cranes, electric tools, etc. Many Canadian and their chil- [illegible] to learn a trade. As soon as any boy receives a diploma [illegible] higher [illegible] industry or the navy.

[illegible] from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. normally, with half an [illegible] until 7 p.m., with some working [illegible] p.m.

[illegible] is not interfered, but [illegible] shortage

[illegible] skilled labor, but this is not acute because [illegible] of workers to all available will [illegible] workers to operate them. This [illegible] and he felt that a full [illegible] of in- [illegible] machines are available. However, [illegible] of skilled labor, and that need will become [illegible] machine tools are made available.

[illegible] there are very workers than machines. This [illegible] shifts and many men are in training.

[illegible] the United States and Great Britain began [illegible] to war industry. This appeared to be a general policy, [illegible] in the army ten years, providing [illegible] would be well [illegible] to maintain his job and until [illegible] Such cases have been heard of lately. [illegible] whether it is still being done. Married [illegible] in industry.

[illegible] army, [illegible] and [illegible] worker [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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

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[redacted]

[redacted]

The [redacted] program [redacted] and emphasis upon exploration for [redacted] and almonds. This overlooks need. They have ever [redacted] to [redacted] claimed to interest the [redacted] subject, [redacted] rights are more readily obtainable. Actually, for [redacted] all [redacted] found in Manchukuo.

[redacted] are going to war industry. Nothing is being diverted to civilian use, [redacted] for necessary civilians.

[redacted] to apply to Japan.

No [redacted] was ever based on the effect that any shortage of [redacted] restricted production of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] is a severe shortage for military requirements, but for [redacted] civilian consumption, still [redacted], adequate. There is [redacted] shortage.

[redacted] troops are used to the privation of [redacted] winter.

[redacted] from [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] civilian consumption [redacted] manufactured. All [redacted] for clothing [redacted] for clothing. [redacted] for civilians, [redacted] for [redacted], before the [redacted] shortage, [redacted] [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted] United States charter, [redacted] partially supplied between [redacted] or rayon. Neither [redacted] in yarns and manufactured [redacted] shortage of clothing, [redacted] or shortage of cotton.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Magnesium alloys are also available, apparently full quantities for plane production, but not for general industrial or domestic purposes.

[redacted]

Plastic is being used, but not to any large extent. The plastic [redacted] is of flat surfaces rather than moulded pieces.

[redacted]

Aluminum is still electrical, as evidenced by continued use of small [redacted] manufacture of household utensils. Aluminum is also being used as a substitute for cast iron. Aluminum products for civilian use include utensils, it is quite if the fact that [redacted] utensils of all kinds are available, and gas burners and stoves made from an alloy of magnesium and aluminum called by them [redacted].

[redacted]

The standard of brass is about the same quality as ever, although [redacted] the irregularity of standards is such that the buyer is not sure of the quality of brass received even though specifications have been satisfied.

[redacted] All instruments, except the clinometer and one [redacted] important, have been [redacted] the Nikkon for their brass and bronze content. This does not include instruments of the most complex and most important airplanes, which are being taken from the civilians, and the government in one [redacted] provided the brass rolling mills [redacted] a regular source.

[redacted]

There is no evidence on the market, even though it was available [redacted] before the war. Phonographs are now being made from bamboo.

[redacted]

[redacted] There is no information as to whether or not Japan has a [redacted] through the export and supply of [redacted] from Manchuria has been [redacted] by the Japanese [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted] Shantung [redacted] Kiangsu, [redacted] Kwangtung.

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [

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OIL

Oil

The oil situation has improved only slightly since the war began, despite additional oil-producing colonies, because not much oil is brought from the Dutch Islands.

Shortly after occupying the Dutch Indies it was heard that a ship carrying 1000 engineers and scientists to those islands to take over oil production was sunk with all on board. Upon arrival [illegible] in December 1943, this rumor was confirmed by a Japanese diplomat [illegible], who spoke of the incident while complaining about that country's unneutral attitude, saying that such losses come from information leaks.

Newspapers claim that oil and rubber production in Sumatra and Java are reaching large proportions and that reconstruction in the southern Islands of oil plants and rubber plantations is coming along. However, it is not believed that any large amount of rubber or oil is being brought from these places.

There are some new refineries in Manchuria, but there are no new ones in Korea. Between [illegible] and [illegible], on the left side of the railway as it leaves [illegible], near [illegible], there is a big oil refinery which unloads oil by pipe to the beach on the [illegible] River. The refinery extends for 200-300 meters along the beach.

Plants for oil hydrogenation were sent to [illegible] (1), [illegible] (2), and [illegible] (1) in 1942 and 1943. These were manufactured by the company for whom the owners worked.

At [illegible], laboratory oils are made from lignite. Here also, is the only place where oil is extracted from light, clay-colored shale by boiling. This also continues and is being enlarged. Crushing and grinding process followed by heating is used in obtaining the oil extract.

Tankers, but not many of them, are bringing crude oil to KOBE and [illegible] from the "North Seas", Shipping coming in this way are much more heavily laden than usually. Oil is probably being brought from the [illegible] Islands.

[illegible] amount of oil in Japan, little information is available. [illegible] an experimental way [illegible] three years ago, oil appeared in [illegible] Hokkaido underground storage.

[illegible] large tanks in the vicinity of KOBE and OSAKA. These are [illegible] "camouflaged" camouflage. There are a [illegible] the [illegible] the regular railway line. Some are [illegible] in the mountains in the rear of the city. There are no new tanks in the [illegible] area. [illegible] tanks are [illegible] along the beach near KOBE. [illegible] there are many tanks [illegible] railroad from KOBE to TOKYO. Those [illegible] camouflaged, and small. [illegible] Harbor there are many tanks, but [illegible] are of use.

[illegible] industry. Coal is used predominately, [illegible] is used in some industries, aluminum for example.

[illegible] in newspapers of Japanese naval activities, about crew life [illegible] etc., emphasize the fact that workers are needed by [illegible].

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Nothing is known about aviation gasoline, although a story was told by a German of gasoline made in Japan and being used in German planes brought by the Japanese. The gasoline employed had a deleterious effect on plane performance and there were arguments between the Japanese and Germans over Japanese claims that the German planes did not meet specifications. It was decided that the fault lay with very poor quality gasoline.

Diesel engines are not popular. Although there never were many diesel-operating plants, those that there were have been forced to change to coal consumption or be sold. Those sold were bought very cheaply by the large Tanaka, Kanebuchi power plant, which used to be entirely diesel engines, changed over five years ago. All power plants are now operated by steam turbines or water power.

There is no fuel for cars or automobiles, except a small amount for military cars. The few taxis are using charcoal, trucks are operated by producer-gas generators, and busses and some cars are being operated by electricity.

Coal

The coal used by Japanese industry comes from Hokkaido, [illegible] Shipping seems to be adequate to meet industrial demands [illegible]

The government operates a strict rationing system with regard to coal available for industry. No coal is distributed to industry until [illegible] production is above the authorized. Then on the basis [illegible] fuel is provided. Factory [illegible] are then given the [illegible] to turn given them to the coal distributor. As the [illegible] the coal delivery is so slow that the producer [illegible] coal controls in the manufacture of articles [illegible] which means that they do not have to have [illegible] official approval. There is no free [illegible] war industries do not experience any short- [illegible] handling the good-quality coal coming from [illegible] from northern Honshu. It is estimated [illegible] reserves are on hand.

[illegible] coal from Korea, and [illegible] coal. This was stopped shortly [illegible]

[illegible] Japanese newspapers that only Japan- [illegible] in Japan, but even this [illegible] heating of houses at all in Japan, which is not [illegible] natives, but applying to the foreigners.

[illegible] fuel, if obtainable, was 90 yen for 1 [illegible] on [illegible] 1 [illegible] ton of coke, and at 120 yen, [illegible] limit, however, to the fuel even [illegible]

[illegible] sold by large collieries, although [illegible] made to supply as follows, before the war [illegible] that they required [illegible] than formerly.

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[redacted] of it at Kure, the biggest [redacted] plant in Japan. [redacted] also unloaded at TOKYO, where the [redacted] coal vessels arriving from Manchuria or Korea [redacted] the route through SHIMONOSEKI, [redacted] the Inland Sea and then [redacted] to Tokyo.

[redacted] railroad, and electric power lines, camouflaged [redacted] green terrain or shadows, were observed. Also seen were [redacted] for water to [redacted]. These are located near [redacted] power stations. No powerhouses could be seen.

[redacted] electric power plant under Japanese control is at [redacted] other active steam electric power station is [redacted] large electric power plant in Japan proper, [redacted]. There are a few small coal-operated [redacted] west of the [redacted] city's power comes from [redacted],

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[redacted]

[redacted] about the number of planes being manufactured, [redacted] on the two fronts. There are no civilian [redacted]; [redacted] military. There is no system whereby pilots [redacted]

[redacted] is indicated by the fact that reserve [redacted] being used to attract high school students [redacted] school age to other aviation. All high schools and universities [redacted] and technical courses, are closed. Courses in [redacted] have been discontinued. [redacted]

[redacted] by the year started a large number of [redacted] capacity to lunge [redacted] to illustrate the [redacted] efficiency. [redacted] substantiated by the high tuberculosis [redacted] examinations are naturally more severe [redacted]

[redacted] such as the development of [redacted] reflexes and other actions. [redacted] unfavorably had, there was no evidence [redacted] may have already taken [redacted] particularly [redacted] to counter [redacted]

[redacted] deficiency of Japanese [redacted] that they had shot [redacted]

[redacted] observed by [redacted]

[redacted] to being seriously [redacted]

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[redacted] One type [redacted] plane, painted green and white with red roundels, [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet planes are used to carry propaganda flights to Shanghai, [redacted] Hangchow, Nanking and Singapore. In the China service called CNAC [redacted]

[redacted] There are also used to carry important military, but no diplomatic, [redacted] General Yamamoto, for example, was killed in such a plane.

[redacted] No air connection with Germany have been heard of.

[redacted] [redacted] there is a big airport.

[redacted] there is an airfield, although as one nearing such [redacted] no planes were observed. Planes fly from here [redacted]

[redacted] is an airfield [redacted]

[redacted] on the beach, there is a big naval emblem [redacted] twenty planes have been flying [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [

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[redacted] trains are traveling at [redacted]. The run between [redacted] and TOKYO [redacted] distance of 953 kilometers. The number [redacted] before the war, 19 to 20 trains [redacted] between [redacted] and TOKYO. Today 3 trains [redacted] there are no limited express trains, and the [redacted] trains are longer, consisting [redacted] where formerly they consisted of [redacted] and [redacted] have been reduced by about [redacted] have increased.

[redacted] Japanese engineers by train, but his [redacted] before the war, all civilian [redacted] work, between [redacted] and TOKYO) because of such [redacted] keep trains moving at night.

[redacted] obvious signs of deterioration of railway equipment. [redacted] stations, are in fairly good condition. [redacted] locomotives and cars are dirty. The [redacted] seat, and are cleaned very often by the [redacted] passenger cars are not as clean as [redacted] cars such as baggage and box cars have [redacted] to be in fairly good condition.

[redacted] are easily operated. [redacted] trains which [redacted] kilometers, or 3 hours, travel [redacted] to [redacted] station stops at one point [redacted] was the case in all [redacted] Some railroad traffic was [redacted] by air raids, despite the availability of [redacted] that all the [redacted] received are from early [redacted] and often give [redacted]

[redacted] particularly vulnerable railway [redacted] running along the east coast, behind [redacted]

[redacted] was built under the Straits, com- [redacted] was finished last September (1945), and [redacted]

[redacted] is to be dismantled for scrap iron. [redacted] Towards, the railroad [redacted]

[redacted] two running sheppalls are driven [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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[redacted] embassies have short-wave radios, but they are the only [redacted] to domestic and foreign broadcasts. However, some [redacted] people via shortwave is not passed on to outsiders [redacted] might be taken by the Japanese. Among themselves, [redacted] talk openly and freely about the war. Information could [redacted] by the embassies. Rise concerning the fall of Attu was [redacted] Japan short-wave radios.

[redacted] is no ship barrier between Japan and this country, although [redacted] same as twice a month between MOSCOW and TOKYO, and [redacted] CHINA.

[redacted] easier for foreigners to get out of Japan to this country than [redacted] difficulties in getting from this country to Japan and no [redacted] getting to Japan. The main reason for difficulties [redacted] embassies is that no diplomatic arrangements can [redacted] This country has no consular people there, for example. [redacted] get in and out of Korea.

[redacted] all of the embassies have short-wave radios, some are [redacted] equipment. It is thought however, that the [redacted] probably employing a skeleton set because of a big [redacted] Embassy staffs. The Soviet Embassy is very secretive; [redacted] Except for the neutral Embassy, the [redacted] social, or professional relations with others [redacted] and is very lonely.

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SECRET

XIX

There is no information available about the Japanese navy or the location of naval bases. Naval matters are kept very secret.

Both Japanese civilians and naval personnel have an exaggerated opinion of the strength of their own navy.

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Japan 14,975

SECRET

Major Lee

Colonel Deering

21 Sept. 1944

Material for Japan Desk

I am sending herewith pencilled list of German firms and individuals which might be useful in the penetration of Japan. The list was prepared by Mr. Mess, a former business associate of Colonel Mann, and who spent many years in Japan.

I am sending also Mr. Mess' letter to me of 19 September. Will you please take whatever action you think appropriate in connection with his letter.

CC: General Donovan
Mr. Knellenberg
Comdr. McMains

O.C.D., Jr.

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SECRET

15 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN:

In the intelligence side, I think that we should have a comprehensive study made of all of the firms in this country that were doing business with Japan. In conjunction with that study, we should obtain the personnel records and see if we could recruit from that personnel anyone who could be employed by us in that field. In connection with this, we should cover the various categories of personnel, not only those who have had prominent positions with Japan, but also those who were down close to earth and had done the actual contacting who were down close to the population. Those who brought them in contact with the population.

I have talked briefly with Whitney about this and he gave me the name of a manufacturer in Pittsburg, a [illegible] now in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian but a client of my old law office. Whitney knows about it and I think you would follow it through and see whether it was, some or not.

Also, I have given to Admiral Berkey on the Pacific operation - Ralph A. Schilling, 2558 N. California Street, Oakland, 7, California.

Once this Japanese line is fairly covered, then [illegible] should be handled in the same way.

When you look into the personnel we have on [illegible] I think you will devise a good way for [illegible] with whom we had talked [illegible] to both sides.

On the Communist side of this work, you will please [illegible] from Whitney dated May 1, 1944 [illegible] [illegible] of Harris, authority to take on Jack [illegible]

W. J. D.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: [illegible] J. Putzell

FROM: [illegible]

DATE: 31 July 1944

SUBJECT: [illegible] on Japanese Publications From Interdepartmental Committee

[illegible] availability of all this material as [illegible] by the two enclosures certainly should be submitted to the Honolulu office for review by all the Intelligence Agencies in the Central Pacific Area.

It is my belief that it is the desire of General Donovan, as expressed in the memorandum to the Intelligence Branches, 29 July 1944, that the index be made a portion of the Intelligence Services forwarded to the Central Pacific Area.

I would appreciate your insuring not only that these publications go forward, but that any future ones from the Interdepartmental Committee bearing remotely on the Central Pacific Area be immediately and automatically forwarded. I am attaching 3 or 4 extra copies of this memorandum in the event you would like to forward them to appropriate branches.

R. D. H.

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Mr. Putzell: Cmdr. Halliwell sent for you about this 9/15

Cmdr. Halliwell: Mr. Putzell wants to know if this material [redacted] in report form for submission to Army and Navy officials in Honolulu has been given to you?

9-25-44 mz Some of this seems to have been given, many a month ago, to OB & 2 Wash. C.G.S.

[redacted]

Exempt No. 6.3

[redacted]

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

RESTRICTED

31 July 1944

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Ensign Frederick G. Kilgour, USNR

TO: General William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Intelligence on Japan obtained from publications.

Enclosure (A) Various Abstracts

(1) Enclosure (A) is sent herewith.

Frederick G. Kilgour
Frederick G. Kilgour

FGK/vbs

enclosures Returned
2 copies to Hallward
1 ltr to Hornbeck

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OSS Form 41a1

Date 7/29/44

To: Commander Millard

Suggest that you might want to look through this for items which might be of interest to Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson.

If you will let me know your desires I will be glad to obtain copies of the items you wish.

W. J. Putnell Jr.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

Outside Agency
Civil matters
Not concerned

[Exam No. 1113]

[Exposure is 4x5 B.&W.]

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RESTRICTED

25 July 1944

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Ensign Frederick G. Kilgour, USNR

TO: General Donovan

SUBJECT: Intelligence in Japanese Publications

Enclosures: (A) Tables of Contents of Japanese Periodicals 21 March 1944
(B) Translations of Tables of Contents of Japanese Publications, 30 June 1944.

(1) Enclosures (A) and (B) are sent herewith.

Frederick G. Kilgour

FGK/ehw

(Documents returned)

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Japan
RESTRICTED

21 July 1944

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Ensign Frederick G. Kilgour, USNR

TO: General Donovan

SUBJECT: Intelligence from Japanese Publications

Enclosure (A) 8 Subject Indexes dealing with Japan

(1) Enclosure (A) is sent herewith.

(2) In the future Subject Indexes covering Japan will be sent as they are issued.

Frederick G. Kilgour
Frederick G. Kilgour

FGK/vhw

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Top ↑

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Exp. No. roll

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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To: Mr. Petrelli

I am informed that Mr. Evans of Far East Desk, SI, prepared the desired report and sent it to you or General Donovan. These are returned for your files if you want to retain them.

F. L. KELLY
22/Aug/44

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From the desk of
F. L. Kelly

(use)

Cut [illegible] card to indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls!

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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OSS Form 151

9-1949

10882-724

Date 7/29/44

To Recording Board

General Donovan has requested that the attached be put in appropriate report form for presentation by him to certain Army and Navy officials in Honolulu.

Please return the attachments with the report.

E. J. Putzell Jr.
Lieutenant (j.g.) USNR
Assistant Exec. Off.

Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

Out
car
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f/6.3

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Outside [illegible] card [illegible] the edges of the camera field

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Lt. Comdr. Metz
[illegible] Gen. Bldg.

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd DA .....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Gen. Donovan					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

[illegible] should be signed [illegible] nature in To column.
[illegible] to your [illegible] name in [illegible]
[illegible] Each [illegible] must [illegible] before [illegible]
[illegible] should initial [illegible] to Comment [illegible]
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14842

Japan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 27, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

To: Director, OSS

From: Divisional Deputy, SI
Far East Theaters

Subject: Japanese Order of Battle -
SINOB Reports on Japanese Tank Units

1. As requested in your note referring to my memorandum of 19 July concerning SINOB Report No. 2, this memorandum is to supplement the earlier information concerning Japanese tank units.

2. Major Crowley's SINOB Report No. 2, a copy of which was attached to my memorandum of July 19, set forth in detail the organization, manpower, armament and heavy equipment of the Japanese 3 TANK DIVISION. This is the only detailed information of this type known to exist in this country. While it does not necessarily follow that all other Japanese tank divisions will be identical, it is logical to assume that this is the result of Japanese thought and study on the subject and that this first known tank division will be in general the prototype of other armored divisions organized during the same period.

3. In my memorandum of 19 July, the relationship of SINOB Reports Nos. 1 and 2 was pointed out, and a copy of Report No. 2, which was regarded as the more important, was attached. Report No. 1, a copy of which is attached hereto, identified and located in North China a number of units of the Japanese Army, including some tank units. These tank units, as they appear in that report, are listed and commented upon immediately below:

"1b. Tank Divisions

"1 Tk D Air Defense Unit"
(1st Tank Division Air Defense Unit)
From discovering this unit, Major Crowley was able to infer the existence of 1 TANK DIVISION, which

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had not been known at the time he left for China. (The bare fact of its existence had, however, been discovered by G-2 in the interim between his departure and this report.) It should be noted that this Air Defense TAI (presumably an anti-aircraft unit) of 1 TANK DIVISION apparently has no counterpart in 3 TANK DIVISION, for SINOB Report No. 2 shows no such unit in listing the components of 3 TANK DIVISION.

"'3 Tk D' (3 TANK DIVISION)"
The existence of this division was previously known. This report confirms its location in North China as late as April of this year, and SINOB Report No. 2 disclosed its organization.

"1c. Tank Brigades

"'3 T B'" (3 Tank Brigade)
The existence of this Tank Brigade was not previously known.

"'6 Tank Brigade'"
The existence of this Tank Brigade was not previously known. SINOB Report No. 2 discloses it to be one of the components of 3 TANK DIVISION. The personnel and equipment of Brigade Hq. are shown in SINOB Report No. 2, but it is not clear whether the Brigade is made up of all three of the division's Tank Regiments or not. It is suggested that the position and function of the "Brigade Hq." here are analogous to those of the Hq. of the divisional Infantry Group in the usual Japanese divisions. Since the triangularization of most so-called "infantry" divisions, brigade organizations have been eliminated and the division Infantry Group Hq., headed by a Major General, exercises command over the three infantry regiments. Since there are three tank regiments in 3 TANK DIVISION and nothing else to make up 6 TANK BRIGADE, the above suggestion seems the logical one. This, of course, leaves unsettled the nature of 5 TANK BRIGADE, supra. Maj. Crowley has commented that it consists of two tank regiments. It may thus exist independently of any divisional organization, or may possibly be a normal brigade in a "square" tank division, if such exists.

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"2a. Infantry

"'3d Mobile (Mechanized) Inf. Regt.'"
SINOB Report No. 2 discloses that this is the infantry component of 3 TANK DIVISION.

"2c. Tank

"'3 Tank Regt.(?)'

"'12 Tank Regt.'

"'13 Tank Regt.'

"'17 Tank Regt.'"

SINOB Report No. 2 discloses that 12, 13 and 17 TANK REGIMENTS are the basic components of 3 TANK DIVISION. The question mark after "3 Tank Regt.' indicates that its existence is probable, but not certain, based on the information at hand. It is not yet placed in any division. It may possibly be a component of 1 TANK DIVISION or 2 TANK DIVISION, the separate units of which have not been identified.

"2d. Artillery

"'34 Mechanized Arty. Regt.'"
SINOB Report No. 2 discloses that this is the artillery component of 3 TANK DIVISION.

4. This material has been analyzed for us by S/Sgt. Ernest J. Brown, whom you will remember from the Buffalo bar.

Milton Katz
Lieut. Comdr., USNR

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

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Japan -

Mr. Lutz -

1. Discovered new unit - 1st Tank Division - never heard of before - doubling known number of tank divisions.

2. Note enclosed list.

3. Information given to Dickey for relay to Washington.

4. Work highly successful - Chinese extremely cooperative.

/s/ RAY CROWLEY

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Kunyin, Shensi, China — SINOB-RP-#1

Ray Cromley - Major - M.I. - O - 922026 — 17 June 1944

J. W. Schneider - Capt. A.U.S. - O - 545550

Following units identified in North China (including Mongolia) from captured Japanese documents (and excerpts) seen by Cromley & Schneider in Honan & Shensi, China in June 1944 at the forward Hq. of the 1st & 8th War Areas.

UNITS	DATE UNIT AT LOCATION	SOURCE SINOB-DD-#
1. Major Formations:		
a. Divisions:		
"26 D"	(12/43)	10
"37 D"	(4/44) (3/44)	8, 14
"62 D"	(4/44) (3/44)	1, 2, 5, 14
"63 D"	(12/43)	10
"Nature 4213, 4214, 4215 [illegible] D" 3220, 3230" TAI	(4/44) (2/44)	16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34
"110 D"	(4/44) (3/44)	1, 2, 5, 14
b. Tank Divisions:		
"1 Tk D Air Defense TAI"	(3/44)	14
"3 Tk D	(4/44) (3/44)	1, 5, 14

Notes: SINOB - OB-# = Reference # of captured documents, copies or excerpts of which are in my possession.

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c. Tank Brigades

"5 TB"	(4/44)	7
[Believe this to be Tank Brig. because it contains two tank regts.]		
"6 Tank Brigade"	(3/44)	13

d. Independent Mixed Brigades

"2 Bn"	(12/43)	10
"3 Bn"	(12/43)	10
"7 Bn"	(4/44)(3/44)	8, 14
"9 Bn"	(4/44)	1

e. Independent Infantry Brigades

"4 Bde"	(3/44)	14
"9 Bde"	(4/44)(3/44)	8, 14

3. Other Units

a. Infantry

"24 Mobile (Mechanized) Inf Regt"	(3/44)	13

c. Tank

"5 Tank Regt"	(?)	11
"12 Tank Regt"	(4/44)(3/44)	7, 13
"18 Tank Regt"	(3/44)	13
"27 Tank Regt"	(3/44)	13

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d. Artillery Units

"1 (10K)/1A"	[1st Field Arty]	(3/44)	14
"3 A"	[3d Field Arty]	(4/44)	7
"10 A"	[10th Field Arty]	(3/44)	2, 14
"8 AA"	[8th Med Arty]	(4/44)(3/44)	1, 4, 14
"11 AA"	[11th Mtn Arty]	(3/44)	14
"27 AA"	[17th Mtn Arty]	(4/44)	1, 2
"1 Cav/6 AS"	[6th Sound Locator TA]	(4/44)	1
"11 AS"	[11th Sound Locator TA]	(3/44)(3/44)	2, 14
"2d Mechanized Arty Regt"		(3/44)	13

e. Anti-Aircraft Units

"15 AA	[15 AAA Regt ?]	(4/44)(3/44)	3, 14

f. Engineering Units

"26 F"	[26 Div Engrs ?]	(3/44)	14
"27 F"	[27 Div Engrs ?]	(4/44)	1, 2
"F/36 F"	[Engrs of 36 Div]	(4/44)	2
"36 Fa"	[36 Ind Engrs]	(3/44)	14
"40 Fa"	[40 Ind Engrs]	(3/44)	14
"24 BT"	[24th Bridging Train]	(3/44)	14
"29 BT"	[29th Bridging Train]	(4/44)(3/44)	3, 14
"31 BT"	[31st Bridging Train]	(3/44)	14

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h. Transport Units

"4/7 D"	[Though clearly written 7 D in original Japanese document, this is possibly a mistake for 70 ?]	(3/44)	14

i. Signal Units

"10 TL"	[10 Signal (Denshin) Regt]	(3/44)	14
"11 TL"	[11 Signal (Denshin) Regt]	(12/44)(W3?)	10

l. Railway Units

Field Railways

"1 Field Railway"	HQ Peiping	(3/44)	12

Railway Regts

"6 R"		(4/44)	4
"13 R"		(4/44)	4

/s/ RAY CROMLEY

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FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Comdr. Katz

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA .....

TO	Init.	Date Sent	Date Rec'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
Mr. Engstrom		19			By Hand Yes I have read a copy of this Memorandum, and am Heartbroken. The U.S. CAD Should have a suggestion that the Magenta Brand be withdrawn

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SENOB Rpt #

July 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM

To Ernest Dorn
Thayer

To: Chief, SI

From: Divisional Deputy, SI, Far East

Subject: Attached SENOB Report No. 2

1. Attached herewith is a copy of Report No. 2, just received from Major Cromley and Captain Schneider. As you will see, this is a complete and detailed report on the organization and strength, both in men and in armament and equipment, of a Japanese tank or armored division. The information was taken from captured Japanese documents obtained and translated by Major Cromley and Captain Schneider during a trip through SHENSI and HONAN provinces made for the purpose of gaining access to such documents. It is the first information of this kind (i.e. so complete and detailed) received by G-2, Washington.

2. Prior to Major Cromley's departure around the 1st of May, the bare fact of the existence of one Japanese armored division was known. In amendments to the Japanese Order of Battle Book issued by MID on 22 June, 1944 it was said of 3 Armored Division "The 3 Armored Division is believed to have been organized by March, 1943. The 1 Cavalry Brigade was absorbed in its formation; nothing further is known concerning its composition. It took part in the HONAN operation in the spring of 1944".

3. Until the organization of 3 Armored Division the Japanese Army, so far as is known, had had no Tank or Armored Divisions. Tanks, chiefly light and some medium, had been used in several of the Japanese campaigns, but they were organized into small units which were added to regular combat divisions or operated in independent tank companies or regiments. No divisional organizations had been built up based primarily upon the fire power, mobility and armor of the tank. They had not been needed against the ill-equipped Chinese, and had not been developed for other Japanese campaigns. However, with the prospect of operations moving out of terrain chiefly jungle, the Japanese have recently begun the organization and equipping of armored divisions.

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Subject: Attached SINOB Report No. 2

1. Attached herewith is a copy of Report No. 2, just received from Major Cromley and Captain Schneider. As you will see, this is a complete and detailed report on the organization and strength, both in men and in armament and equipment, of a Japanese tank or armored division. The information was taken from captured Japanese documents obtained and translated by Major Cromley and Captain Schneider during a trip through SHENSI and HONAN provinces made for the purpose of gaining access to such documents. It is the first information of this kind (i.e. so complete and detailed) received by G-2, Washington.

2. Prior to Major Cromley's departure around the 1st of May, the bare fact of the existence of one Japanese armored division was known. In amendments to the Japanese Order of Battle Book issued by MID on 22 June, 1944 it was said of 3 Armored Division "The 3 Armored Division is believed to have been organized by March, 1943. The 1 Cavalry Brigade was absorbed in its formation; nothing further is known concerning its composition. It took part in the HONAN operation in the spring of 1944".

3. Until the organization of 3 Armored Division the Japanese Army, so far as is known, had had no Tank or Armored Divisions. Tanks, chiefly light and some medium, had been used in several of the Japanese campaigns, but they were organized into small units which were added to regular combat divisions or operated in independent tank companies or regiments. No divisional organizations had been built up based primarily upon the fire power, mobility and armor of the tank. They had not been needed against the ill-equipped Chinese, and had not been developed for other Japanese campaigns. However, with the prospect of operations moving out of terrain chiefly jungle, the Japanese have recently begun the organization and equipping of armored divisions.

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4. Report No. 2 gives in complete detail the organization of 3 Armored Division, listing, on page 3, its component units, and giving the manpower and equipment of each unit. This, in turn, is followed by a breakdown of each component, so that the divisional organization, manpower, armament and equipment is set forth in full.

5. Major Cromley's Report No. 1, also just received, based also on captured Japanese documents, gave information as to the existence and location of a number of units of the Japanese Army in North China, among them an armored division, the First, which was new to him. The existence of this division and also of the Second Armored Division had been discovered by the Order of Battle Section of G-2 subsequent to Major Cromley's departure. Nothing was known of their organization, manpower, fire power or equipment, vital factors, of course, in any operations involving them.

6. Both reports have been shown to Col. Svenson, Chief of the Pacific Section of O.B., G-2, who showed great pleasure in obtaining them, particularly Report No. 2. It is our feeling that it represents a brilliant beginning of the mission of Major Cromley and Captain Schneider.

Milton Katz
Lieut. Comdr., USNR

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Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA .....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Out'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Capt. J.T.					Returned to Comm. Liaison
2. Lieut. Edwards					
3. Comm. Liaison					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Each person should initial in the appropriate column as item should be given to next person and comments either to explain delay in the column or to explain why item was not passed on. When completed, return to Comm. Liaison. Receiving person should sign for receipt in Comments column. Any questions should be referred to Comm. Liaison.

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Suuyin, Shansi, China
Ray Crowley - Major MI - 0-922-26
J. W. Schneider - Capt. AUS - 0-546550

SINOB - RP - #2
18 June 1944

THIRD TANK DIVISION

Information based on captured Japanese documents and excerpts seen by Crowley and Schneider in SUIYUAN and HONAN in June 1944.

		Source SINOB- CD #
1.	Abbreviated name "3 TKD"	1, 2, 3, 12, 14
2.	Code Name - see following report for evidence regarding TAKI & TOKA	
3.	Code No. see following report for discussion of #5540	
4.	Commanding General - YAMAFI Hideo (1/44) Date of regulations containing his name and position?	8
5.	Chief of Staff - "Colonel NASHIMASA"? ( ) Personal name unknown?	13
6.	G-3 Operations "Lt Col NAGAYAMA" ( ) Personal name unknown?	13

NOTE - All information on this and succeeding pages is taken directly from captured Japanese documents (and excerpts). Deductions and corrections are enclosed in brackets [ ]. Roman numerals (I) (II) refer to notes.

Pages 2 onward are direct translations from SINOB - CD - #13. A copy of Japanese document dated "SHOWA 19-3-18" (18 March 1944) and entitled "TAKI Division Staff Organization" on 1st page succeeding pages show orgn. of sub-units. This document was captured in HONAN in May 1944.
(YENCHIU)

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ITEM 7
SUMMARY OF STRENGTH
Source - SINOB - CD - #13

a. Personnel

Officers	489
WO	104
NCO	1,900
EM	8,835
	11,328

b. Vehicles & Tanks

Medium Tanks	175
Light Tanks	140
Trucks	1,115
?Large Troop Carriers	27 [illegible]
?Small Troop Carriers	175 [illegible]

[illegible] study of figures in the following tables indicates that each medium tank is armed with one 57 mm or one 47 mm [illegible] and each light tank is armed with one 37 mm gun and 2 [illegible] mm. This seems extraordinarily heavy armament for light tanks. Though show (with one exception) an exact correlation, company by company, hq by hq between light tanks & 37 mm guns. Such a close correla- tion could hardly be accidental.[illegible]

"PRINCIPAL ARMAMENTS"

"Model 90 Field Guns"	12
"Model 91 Howitzers"	16
"Model 41 Mtn Guns"	8
"KwK 47 mm Guns"	34 [illegible]
"57 mm A/TK Guns"	175 [illegible]mounted on medium tank[illegible]
"37 mm A/TK Guns"	140 [illegible]mounted on light tanks[illegible]
"Model 94 - 37 mm A/TK Guns"	17
"A/A (KOSMA) mounted on Vehicle"	7
"M.G." " " "	418 [illegible]Mounted on tank[illegible]

[illegible]Comment SINOB - CD - #13 lists only "Principal Armaments". Rifles, carbines, pistols and MG carried by troops not included. M.G. listed seemingly are only those mounted on tanks and other vehicles, though this is not specifically stated in document[illegible]

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SIMOB - 42 - 44
15 June 1944

ITEM 8
CONSOLIDATION
Source - SIMOB - CD - 913

	Officers and Men	Pistols	Rifles	Sub-Machine Guns	Light Machine Guns	Heavy Machine Guns	60-mm Mortars	81-mm Mortars	4.2-inch Chemical Mortars	Antitank Guns (37-mm)	Remarks
		Med.	Light								
Division Hq	502	7	2								
5th Tk Brig Hq	77	5	2								
2 Tk Regt	949	50	31								
3 Tk Regt	866	50	31								
7 Tk Regt	949	50	31								
3rd Mech Inf Regt (X145)	2,870		9	227	47	18		6		14	Data subject to variation as information is received.
Div A/T Unit	450					16					
Div Recon Unit	529	10	51								
3rd Mech (X105) Arty Regt	1,215						12		16		
Div Engr Unit	1,030										
Div Maint. Unit (Fm 7)	614	3	3								
Div Transport Unit	978										
Div Casualty Clearing Unit	208										
Div Field Hospital	161										
Total	11,726	175	140								

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ITEM 9
VEHICLES
Source - Minob - CD - #13

Medium Tanks	175	
Light Tanks	140	
Armored Construction Machines	6	Note I
Large Troop Carriers	27	II
Small Troop Carriers	179	III
Command Cars	28	IV
Armored Infantry Vehicles	20	V
	1115	
Trucks	63	
1-Ton Trailers	11	VI
Armored Scout Cars	86	
Light Repair Cars	6	
Heavy Repair Cars	4	
Ordnance	1,854	

- NOTES -

1. Translators notes are in brackets [ ], where one figure is crossed out and another inserted in brackets [ ], the original document has been corrected by translator.

2. Explanations:
MINOB - CD - #1, #2, #13 etc.
MINOB - RP - #2

CD = Captured Japanese Document
RP = Intelligence Report (My Own)
OB = Order of Battle
SIN = Our Distinguishing Code Name.

3. Special Notes:

I. - Armored Construction Machines ?
II - Large Troop Carriers ?
III - Small Troop Carriers ?
IV - Command Cars ?
V - Armored Infantry Vehicles ?
VI - Armored Scouting Car ?
VII - (Kind) 47 mm Guns -
VIII - Maint. Unit ?
IX - Clothing Issuing Depot ?
X - 57 mm Gun Ammunition to believe this is a [illegible] for 57 mm & 47 mm guns ?

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SIXTH TANK BATTALION HQ

	O	WO	EO	EM	Total	Tanks	Troop Carriers	Trucks	Total	Arty Guns	MMG	Wt Mtr
Headquarters	8	0	18	51	77	5	2	2	2	8	19	5	2	14	31

Page 4 of original document.

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[illegible]

Regtl Hq	11	2	31	45	89	4	3	1	2	4		14	4	3	11		21	
#1 Coy	4	2	35	63	104		12		1	4		17		12	14		38	
#2 Coy	4	2	43	94	143	11	4		1	15		21	11	4	30		45	
#3 Coy	4	2	39	98	143	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		45	
#4 Coy	4	2	43	94	143	11	4		1	5		21	11	6	30		47	
#5 Coy	4	2	32	105	143	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		45	
Maint. Coy	5	3	20	147	175	2			3	34	4	45	2		4	3	9	
Total	36	15	243	646	940	50	31	1	10	62	4	180	59	31	183	3	276	

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[illegible] SECRET SIR-x-62
18 June 1944

1944 TOE/ TAT

	O	WO	EM														
Regtl Hq	13	2	27	45	[illegible]	4	3	1	2	4		14	4	3	14		[illegible]
#1 Coy	4	2	26	70	102		12		1	4		[illegible]	12	12	14		38
#2 Coy	4	2	38	85	129	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		46
#3 Coy	4	2	38	85	129	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		46
#4 Coy	4	2	38	85	129	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		46
#5 Coy	4	2	38	85	129	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		46
Maint Coy	5	2	24	130	161	2			3	34	6	47	2		4	3	9
Total	38	14	229	585	866	50	31	1	10	62	6	168	50	31	164	3	316

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	O	WO	NCO	EM	Total	Rifle	Rifle	Rifle	Rifle	Automatic	Light Mortar	Light Mortar	2.36" Rocket Launcher	2.36" Rocket Launcher	Light Machine Gun	Light Machine Gun	Pistol
Regt Hq	12	1	32	45	90	4	3	1	3	6		17	4	3	14		31
#1 Coy	5	1	25	80	111		12		2	4		17		12	24		36
#2 Coy	5	1	37	100	143	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		45
#3 Coy	5	1	37	100	143	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		45
#4 Coy	5	1	37	100	143	11	4		1	5		21	11	4	30		45
#5 Coy	5	1	37	100	143	11	4		2	5		21	11	4	30		45
Maint Coy 7/VIII/	6	0	20	150	176	2			3	34	8	47	2		4	3	9
Total	43	6	225	675	949	50	31	1	11	64	8	165	50	31	142	3	246

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SECRET - Security Information

13 June 1944

D

[redacted]

Regtl Hq	9	3	12	91	115			1	3		12		16										
Hq	8	1	19	129	157	3		1	3	4	12		23		6		5	6		17			
61 Coy	4	1	26	129	160				2		11		13						1	1			
62 Coy	4	1	14	137	156				2		11		13						1	1			
63 Coy	3	2	14	143	162				2		11		13						1	1			
M.G. Coy	[redacted]								2		11		13						1	1			
Total	[redacted]					3		1	11	4	56		75	6		3		6	12	20			
Hq	9	1	19	129	157	3		1	3	4	12		23	6		3		6		15			
64 Coy	3	2	[redacted]	146	165				2		11		13						1	1			
65 Coy	3	2	14	138	157				2		11		13						1	1			
66 Coy	3	2	15	137	157				2		11		13						1	1			
M.G. Coy	3	1	14	141	159				2		11		13						1	1			
Total	20	8	76	691	795	3		1	11	4	56		75	6		3		6	10	19			
Hq		1	19	129	157	3		1	3	4	12		23	6		3		6		15			

[redacted]

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SINCB - 22 - 42
18 June 1944

D

38 MECHANIZED (CAVALRY) RECONNAISSANCE ARMY - cont.

	O	WO	NCO	EM		Rifle	Pistol	Shotgun	Light Machine Gun	Heavy Machine Gun	Light Mortar 60mm	Heavy Mortar 81mm	Armored Car 37mm	Armored Vehicle 37mm	Light Artillery 75mm	Light Artillery 105mm
#7 Coy	3	1	15	133	152		2			11				13		1	1
#8 Coy	3	1	14	130	149		2			11				13		1	1
#9 Coy	3	2	14	138	157		2			11				13		1	1
H.Q. Coy	3	2	14	138	157		2			12				13		9	9
Total	20	8	76	668	772	3	1	11	4	56				75	6	3	6	12	27
Regtl Arty Unit	5	1	17	126	149			2		12				14	6				4
Maint Coy (VII)	9	3	21	218	251			5	2	35	12 (V)			55				3	3
Total	36	29	773 (949)	2478	3270	9	4	43	14	227	12	1	X10	6	18	9	18	29	90

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SECRET - US - AE
18 June 1944

[34 Tank] Division A/Tk Unit

	O	WO	EM	Bn	Total	Carriers		Trucks							
						[M7 Large]	[T16 Small]								
Hq	10	1	13	25	49	2	3	3							
[1] Coy	4		23	92	119		2	4	6						
[2] Coy	4	1	16	82	103		2	4	5						
[3] Coy	4	1	21	79	105		2	4	5						
[VII] Maint Plat	2		19	53	74		1	15		4					
TOTAL	24	3	92	331	450	2	10	35	16	4					

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[34 Tank] Division MM Unit

	O	WO	EM	Bn	Total	Tanks		Troop Carriers										
						[Sherman]	[Stuart]	[M7 Large]	[T16 Small]									
Hq	6	1	12	29	48		2	1	1	2								
[1] Coy	4	1	31	62	83		14		1	4								
[2] Coy	4	1	21	67	93		14		1	4								
[3] Coy	3	1	14	125	146				1	12								
[4] Coy	3	1	12	65	84	10	2		1	4								
Garrison Coy	3	1	10	56	70				1	14	4							
TOTAL	23	6	96	404	529	10	31 [M7]	1	7 [M5]	41	4							

[Sic] original document uses 31 in determining total of light tanks

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3RD MOBILE (MECHANIZED) ARTILLERY REGT

| | WO | MCO | OR | Troop Carriers | | |

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DIVISION ENGINEERING UNIT

	O	WO	NCO	EM	TOTAL	Troop Carriers 3/4 Ton	Troop Carriers 1½ Ton	Cargo 2½ Ton	Cargo 4 Ton	Amphibian Tractor	Light Recon Car	TOTAL	M	81 mm	4.2"	TOTAL
Hq	11		20	66	84		1				4	12	1	1		2
#1 Coy	3	2	17	110	132						15	15	1	1		2
#2 Coy	3	2	20	120	145	3				5	10	18	1	1		2
#3 Coy	4	2	18	108	132			2			13	15	1	1		2
#4 Coy	3	2	19	118	142			2			13	15	1	1		2
#5 Coy	4	2	19	114	139			2			15	15	1	1		2
#6 Coy	4	2	19	118	143	3		2		5	10	18	1	1		2
Maint Coy [VII]	4	2	12	88	117			2	1		36	47				
Total	44	14	144	842	1040	6	1	17	1	6	116	153	6	6	12	

[Page 12 of original document]

DIVISION TRANSPORT UNIT

	O	WO	NCO	EM	TOTAL	Troop Carriers 3/4 Ton	Troop Carriers 1½ Ton	Cargo 2½ Ton	Cargo 4 Ton	Light Recon Car	TOTAL	M	81 mm	4.2"	TOTAL
Hq	6		11	24	45	1	1	1	3		6				
#1 Coy	5	1	19	117	140		1	5	54		60	1	2		3
#2 Coy	3	1	16	113	133		1	5	54		60	1	2		3
#3 Coy	4	1	16	119	142		1	5	54		60	1	2		3
#4 Coy	3		17	110	130		1	5	9	10	25				
Maint Coy [VII]	2		9	77	88		1	3							
Total	23	3	90	562	678	1	6	24	225	19	269	4	8	12	

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11,742

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Mr. Katz

THIS HAS A REAL RUSH!

As was Report 1. also.

(signed)
Ray Cromley

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DIVISION CASUALTY CLEARING UNIT

	O	WO	NCO	EM								
Hq	2		2	17	24	1	2					
Ambulance Section	5	1	4	6	16	1	1					
Collecting Platoon	1	0	3	65	71		1					
Platoon	1		5	65	71		10					
Platoon	1		5	65	71		10	1	1			
Squad	1	1	1	6	9	1	10(-)	1	1			
Squad			1	12	13		1(-)					
Total	9	2	27	12	13		1(-)					

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FIELD HOSPITAL

	O	WO	NCO	EM								
Hq	3		14	88	100	2	8					
Clothing Issuing Dept.	2		5	25	30			10	1	1		
Sanitation Dept.	4		4	80	88		3					
Parts	4	1	4	40	49		2	2				
Drug Dept.	2		2	10	14		7	0				
								7				
TOTAL	15	1	47	170	281	2	25	5				
								27	1	1		

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TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
U. S. SECRET SERVICE

REFER TO FILE NO.

August 26, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Donovan:

Thank you for your letter of July 19, 1944, with reference to the possibility that loyal pro-Japan Japanese might attempt to harm our officials in the event that the defeat of Japan becomes certain.

Your cooperation in advising us of the result of your symposium is much appreciated, and be assured that we will be very glad to receive any additional information which may come to your attention with respect to this problem.

Very truly yours,

Chief, U. S. Secret Service

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Very truly yours,

Frank J. Wilson

Chief, U. S. Secret Service

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Japan
x Secret Service

July 19, 1944

Mr. Frank J. Wilson,
Chief, U.S. Secret Service,
15th St. & Pennsylvania Ave.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wilson:

May I bring to your attention the following report which resulted from a symposium conducted among experts (many of whom were loyal Japanese): The question propounded was what the Emperor and the military and naval leaders would do when the defeat of Japan became certain? The consensus was that the Emperor would commit hari kari, and that the military and naval leaders would follow suit, just as General Hoji did when Emperor Meiji died.

I bring this to your attention because I thought you would consider important the warning which followed this prediction. That is, if and when such an event occurred, our home front would need watching because some desperate, loyal pro-Japan Japanese may attempt to harm our officials.

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William J. Donovan
Director

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14 FOI
Japan

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Justice Dept.
Borkin

TO : Brig. Gen. W. J. Donovan July 22, 1944

VIA : W. L. Langer

FROM : C. B. Fahs CBF

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Reports of Dept. of Justice

Four copies of each of the reports on Japanese industry which accompanied Mr. Joseph Borkin's letter to you of July 15, 1944 are now in the files of the R and A Branch. Two additional copies of each of them have been sent to outposts in the Far East.

Both as general background and as sources for data required for specific projects these and similar Dept. of Justice reports have been used regularly by the staff of the Economic Subdivision of the Far Eastern Division.

Our experience has been that the quality of this series of reports is spotty, largely because the quantity and quality of the source material available from the sources used varies widely from subject to subject. None of the data are more recent than 1941 and much of them are earlier than that.

Although these reports have real value as background material, few of our operating needs can be met primarily from them. Not only is it necessary to utilize what resources we have on developments since 1941, but it is usually found necessary in the case of such projects as specific target studies to go back to the sources covered by the Dept. of Justice in order to insure that all the data bearing on the specialized questions involved in target analysis are secured.

For example in connection with an air target folder project on which OSS and FEA are cooperating with the Navy, OP 16 Y4 of the Navy is using Mr. Nolting, author of two of the reports sent to you, to contact again the sources used for these and other reports he has prepared on the Japanese electronics industry for specific data required for the target project and which were not within the scope of these Justice Dept. reports. He has secured a large quantity of important additional material.

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Mr. Martin's report on the general problem of industrial information will further amplify this statement.

Four copies of the documents are returned herewith.

William N. Dwyer

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 1, 1944

General William J. Donovan
Strategic Services
[illegible]
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Pursuant to the Department of Justice reports covering the material we discussed this morning.

These reports include:

Digest of reports released by Economic Warfare Section,
[illegible] to May 1944.
Mitsubishi Electric Company, Japan,
[illegible] in L'Indochine,
Supplementary Report on the Banque De L'Indochine,
Further report on Banque Nationale Pour Le Commerce Et L'Industrie ("Lazard's Bank"),
Subsidiaries of Universal Oil Products Company and the [illegible] Company, and
Mitsubishi Electric Manufacturing Co., Japan.

In sending a complete set of all our reports within the [illegible].

Respectfully yours,

Joseph Borkin

Joseph Borkin

Enclosures

7/26/44

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18 July 1944

Mr. Joseph Borkin,
Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Borkin:

Thank you very much for the material prepared by the Economic Warfare Section. I appreciate greatly your sending it to me.

I am having it gone over and will discuss it with you later.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 August 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. E. J. Putzell

From: Lt. Thomas J. McFadden, USNR
Acting Chief, MO-Pac/FE

Subject: Kurtsinger Manuscript

Dear Ed:

I return herewith the photostatic copies of documents sent to General Donovan by Judge Allman with a memorandum from Judge Allman dated July 24 which is attached to the enclosures. You will note that Judge Allman requested that these documents be returned to him.

General Donovan handed the enclosures to me shortly after he received them and asked me to have some of our Japanese experts review the Kurtsinger manuscript to see whether they thought it was worth completing. I am sending you herewith memoranda in the form of brief book reviews by Mr. Edward T. Horn, who is a member of our Panel of Far East experts, and by Bruce Rogers, a member of our staff, who served with the U. S. Embassy in Japan. These reviews indicate that the attached manuscript has a lot of useful though standard information and that it would be improved by some revision if it is to be completed and especially if a large number of copies are to be made.

Lt. Thomas J. McFadden, USNR

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Tentative Outline of a Book entitled "Japanese Characteristics" or "The Japanese-Nature & Mind" or "The Nature of the Japanese"

by Kurt Singer, Feb. 1943

About one-third of the projected work is submitted for review. The work is to be in 4 parts. Part I (complete) The Individual; Part II The Social Fabric (of which but one chapter No. 1 on "Virtual Enmity" appears in the MS); Part III (of which nothing is yet written); Part IV Political Factors (of which but one Chapter, No. 4 on Bushido, is included.)

The writer claims to have had the opportunity to observe the Japanese at close range and under singularly favorable circumstances. He says he is seeking a new interpretation of Japanese essentials, the nature of their minds, the causes of their strength and the direction of their policies. Incidentally the work is intended to serve the practical purpose of helping us to see what we are fighting for and against, and, after the war, what we may have to build on and what to reject.

Judged by his own alleged aim, it is my opinion that the book must be labeled "helpful". The author knows the usually accepted authorities and in addition cites much of his material from translations of contemporary Japanese writers. These passages are illuminating.

There is little that is new, but much that is interesting in his presentation. Part I, Chapter III, 1 & 2, in which he discusses the development and training of the Japanese boy, educational environment, and the qualities and position of women is very good - as is also part 3 of the same chapter on "cruelty".

Chapter IV entitled "A Confession," in which the author analyses Natsume's novel Kokoro, showing the strain of melancholia in Japanese men (which has a definite relation to their willingness to sacrifice their own lives and the lives of others-Reviewer) also will repay study.

Likewise Part I, Ch. V on Nature. In my opinion this is one of the best chapters in the book, discussing the Japanese dual or "amphibic" nature, convention, "face", the Japanese one-track mind, lack of third-dimensional quality and true personality.

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Part IV, Ch. IV on Bushido is a courageous apology of Nitobe's "Bushido, the soul of Japan", clarifying some hitherto controversial questions regarding the actual influence of the code of the warrior.

In criticism it must be said that the work requires drastic editing; for practical purposes much of the abstruse groping for obscure (sometimes far-fetched) sources and origins might profitably be omitted or at least simplified. Much that will be of greater practical value than the Manuscript as submitted, remains yet to be written, as e.g., the projected chapters on Shinto, Kodo (The Imperial Way), Suicide, prospect of revolution, etc.

The accumulation of factual material and citation of authoritative statements on the subjects treated is impressive, but the author's reflections and conclusions often seem romantic or fantastic.

There are at least two manifest errors; in regard to the occasion of General Nogi's death (he waited till Meiji's death because the Emperor had forbidden him to commit suicide during his lifetime); and Nitobe's death (which occurred after he had returned from virtual exile to his native land).

Edward T. Horn

Aug. 9, 1944.

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MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. Thomas J. McFadden, USNR
Acting Chief, MO-Pac/IS

From: Bruce Rogers

Subject: Criticism of Kurtzinger's manuscript on Japanese Characteristics.

On a thorough reading of this manuscript I find little that is new and startling. It seems to be a rehash of the old authorities, such as Hearn, Alcock, Perry, Kaempfer, Francis Javier, Harris, et al., presenting quotations from them without lining them up to present a point or support a thesis. There are a number of technical errors in spelling and typing, but none of so serious a nature as to impair the general correctness of the manuscript.

In fact, it is this very correctness that I would criticize. I find no presentation of a theory, no statement made which would make his subject stand out. He reaches the startling conclusion that the Japanese are human beings, motivated by the same desires and influences that move the general bulk of humanity. When he finds a difference, he explains it by the fact that we all have the same attributes, but through training some races or nations have some parts hidden, some showing, and that these hidden and shown attributes may differ.

I feel that he makes the same mistake that is made by so many Western writers, i.e., judging the Japanese as a nation by those Japanese with whom he comes in contact, and a contact perforce limited because of the language and cultural barrier. He quotes his servants, his students, dread many of his conclusions from what Japanese literature has been prepared in Western languages.

He is apt to take coincidences and quote them in evidence of historical relationships. For instance the name of the Phoenician god Kabiri and the Japanese word for the same, Kami. He merely states the fact as significant.

Without wishing to appear hypercritical, it would seem that he has the scholarly inquisitive for small things, the forest because of the trees. He states that childhood care is

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responsible for Japanese acquiesance to fate. Not a very startling statement. Japanese love of nature makes them subservient to it. Makes the common comparison of the gentleness of Japanese women and the uncouthness of Japanese men. He states that Buddhism has had a very good effect upon Japanese life and that the Japanese are given to acceptance of military domination. That the Japanese have a mental discipline. He also states that the Japanese have a primitive psychology and are separated from their true nature by a mere shell of convention and civilization. This is perhaps common to the human race, not only to the Japanese.

One statement strikes the reader as good: "Japanese are composed of Buddhist feeling and Confucian thought". Harbinger also gives a prominent place to Bushido attributing a rather great antiquity and importance to it. Also the Japanese are a mixture of simplicity and complexity; again not very startling.

If any vein can be said to run through the book, which might have been better organized, it is the theme that the Japanese are human beings and differ very little from the rest of the world.

I would say the book would be very good for those people who have no knowledge of Japan, yet wish a scholar's approach to it.

Bruce Rogers

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OSS Form 105a

DATE 8-18-44

TO: Col Burton

Subject: F.B.Opper & PM
Chungking.

Attached is extract from the OSS report from Chungking for June 1944. It would seem from this report that this project has been turning in good stuff out there. It goes into the pot out there and we cannot identify the material when it get over here.

No need to return the attached but I thought that you would be interested since we had been given the general impression that nothing worth while had been produced.

FROM: M. P. Allman

1245 Q EXT.

(Initials)

Even No. rolls

Exposure 1/25 @ f.6.3

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OSS FORM 1088

DATE 8-18-44

TO: Col Burton

Subject: F.T.Opper & PW
Chungking.

Attached is extract from the OSS report from Chungking for June 1944. It would seem from this report that this project has been turning in good stuff out there. It goes into the pot out there and we cannot identify the material when it get over here.

No need to return the attached but I thought that you would be interested since we had been given the general impression that nothing worth while had been produced.

FROM: A. V. Allison

1245 Q EXT.

(Room)

Extract from No. 2 Wks

It appears in 25 D.F. 6.3

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See report from Major Wm. C. Wilkinson dated June 30, 1944.

See II Base 2 Paragraph 3.

Mr. F. T. Opper. Mr. Opper's reports continue to be a valuable source of information to us.

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Confidential

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Special Projects

Accession No. .....

X Alleman

Date rec'd SA .....

To	Room No.	Date rec'd.	Date fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
Chief SI				MD.	
Judge					Please ask Counsel & whether he wishes to continue to receive these reports
					MD
					Called Allman RT

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officers designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

FORM

RESTRICTED

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Japan 14,789

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

Via: Chief, SI

From: N. F. Allman

Subj: Japanese Biographies

The following additional Japanese biographies have been received today from the Special Projects:

SHIMADA, Shigetaro Admiral
KAYA, Lt. General Prince Tsunenori,
NAGUMO, Chuichi, Vice Admiral
YAMADA, Otozo, General
SAWAMOTO, Yoshio, Vice Admiral
SUGAHARA, Lt. General Michio
TSUJIMURA, Rear-Admiral Takehisa
SAITO, Lt. General Yoshitsugu
SUGIYAMA, Gen, General
OHNO, Susumu
OHNZU, Yoshijiro, General
USHIROKU, Jun; Lt. General
Chang, Chi-jo
KOISO, General Kuniaki
TOJO, Hideki, General
ENDO, Ryusaku
IGUICHI, Sadao
MUTO, Yoshio
MATSUZAKA, Hiromasa
AHAKAWA, Daitaro
SHIINA, Etsusaburo
HASHIMOTO, Seiichiro
IWAMURA, Michiyo
YANE, Kiojiro
HAMEMITSU, Tsuneo

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MIYOSHI, Hideyuki
NAKANO, Hamisuki
KOIZUMI, Chikahiko
GOTO, Fumio
OGATA, Taketora
AMAU, Eiji
ABE, Nobuyuki
MAEDA, Kenzo
KISHI, Shinsuke

These biographies have been sent to R & A (Biographical Records) and X-2. Copies will be sent to you if you desire them.

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Secret

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN August 1, 1944

Via: Chief, SI

From: M. P. Allman MKA

Subj.: Transmission of reports.

Attached is a copy of a report concerning activities of Mr. W. P. Hung, dated July 15, 1944, received from Chungking. This report is not from the Special Projects, but may be of interest to you none the less.

The following reports were received from Special Projects today:

C. T. Liang
James Yen
China National Aviation Corporation
S. H. Tan
Changshao Factory
Chinese Policy on Officials Leaving Chungking
Occupied Shanghai
Oil Development in Sinkiang and Kansu
Chinese Triple Seventh Meeting and Publicity

Most of these reports were requested by interested agencies and all have been sent to the Reporting board

Attachment- Copies of above/

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO [illegible]

DATE: 1 August 1944

FROM [illegible]

SUBJECT Summary of Report on Chinese Currency Plans

Pursuant to your request, there follows a summary of a report on Chinese currency plans received by Judge Altman from Special Projects and forwarded to you on [illegible].

The greater part of the report consists of a statement and discussion of various aspects of the American, British and Canadian drafts of an international financial union. The particular section which covers the interests of China in relation to such an organization may be summarized as follows:

China's postwar problem will be how to obtain the greatest benefit from the foreign exchange resources available to her; how to improve trade terms in her own favor; and how to obtain the greatest benefit from the international organization with surrender of the least amount of sovereignty.

It will be desirable for China to raise the value of the yuan in relation to other currencies. This will conserve her resources and encourage imports; the latter are needed to combat the present inflation, which is caused in part by the scarcity of goods in the domestic market. Re-valuation of the yuan may cause a loss in exports, but this can be compensated for by Government subsidies, which have the same advantages as tariffs without being likely to arouse the same international opposition. Along with the higher external value of the yuan, there must be a drop in domestic yuan prices; it is further proposed that the external value of the yuan should be set at a high level in comparison with its purchasing power in the domestic market. Thus, the yuan price of a one-dollar American product might be lowered from 40 to [illegible], and the yuan-dollar exchange rate changed from 20 to 1 to 20 to 1; then, in spite of the reduced domestic price, there would still be a margin of 10 yuan as an incentive for further imports.

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after the war, China will prefer a flexible rate [illegible] that is rigidly fixed. For a few [illegible] will probably have to retain government [illegible] foreign exchange markets. As a condition to participation in any international monetary [illegible], China should be allowed an initial transition period, during which she would be free to adjust her prices and [illegible] to meet any necessary financial conditions. Foreign controls would be terminated as [illegible] permitted.

There will be a heavy flow of foreign capital into China after the war, and this will create an international [illegible] adverse to her. It will accordingly be [illegible] for China to segregate capital transactions from current items, for otherwise her financial [illegible] may result in imbalance, and other countries [illegible] excuse to oblige China to reduce the [illegible] value of her currency."

John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
1st Lt., JAGD

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OS Form 4001

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date

TO	Name	Initials
	O. C. [illegible] jr.	
	C. A. [illegible]	
	J. B. [illegible]	
	D. C. [illegible]	
	G. B. Pfaff	
	R. E. [illegible]	
	H. J. Purcell, jr.	
	A. W. [illegible]	
	R. Th[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	

(Drop)

John

Will you [illegible]

as I'll [illegible]

[illegible]

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the camera field

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

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14,719

Major
Special projects
Allman, NF

DATE: July 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

Via: Chief, SI WWD

From: N. P. Allman NPA

SUBJ: The Chinese Currency Plan

There is attached a copy of Chinese Currency Plans. This was received in January 1944 from the Special Projects and was sent at that time to the Reporting Board for distribution to R & A, MO and FEA.

This report is still timely in view of the present Monetary Conference, and you may therefore be interested in it.

We would like this copy back at your convenience.

Attachment-1 Above ref.

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Japan
1 Special Projects
1 Gillman

18 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Here is a short biographical report on General Chen Chi-mai which I believe may interest you.

William J. Donovan
Director

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Subject: General Chen Chi-mai

General Chen Chi-mai, a revolutionary of doubtful reputation, Chekiang landlord and Imperial officer, was a patron of Chiang Kai-shek. Together with his nephews, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu, who are today powerful Kuomintang bosses, he helped finance and sponsor the present Generalissimo in early revolutionary days. Chiang and the Chen brothers, under the guidance of Chen Chi-mai, are said to have taken blood brotherhood oaths in times when the Kuomintang was a small secret society.

Such close connection with the Chens proved valuable to Chiang for many years. Chen Kuo-fu was made Chiang's secretary when he became Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army. He financed Chiang's career in part, was helpful in destroying the left-wing of the Kuomintang, and is now Minister of Organization of the Kuomintang. Chen Li-fu, the main organizer of Mme. Chiang's New Life Movement, is presently Minister of Education and responsible for current "thought control" policies.

Although their services, political connections and financial backing proved useful in the rise of Chiang Kai-shek, it is now problematical whether their continued proximity to the Generalissimo will be beneficial. Their ardent revolutionary days have long since passed and the reactionary institutions and policies of the "CC Clique" have evoked severe criticism from the outside world and from factions opposing fascist tendencies in Chungking. Their influence is a powerful factor, particularly when regarded in the light of close bonds with Chiang, fostered by their uncle Chen Chi-mai.

Chen Chi-mai started life as an apprentice to a pawn-shop keeper and was subsequently engaged in the silk trade in Shanghai where he joined the revolutionary party. He studied military science in Japan and there met Chiang, then a young student, and was instrumental in initiating him into revolutionary activities and secret societies.

Though Chiang returned to China, he went again to Japan in 1907. While there, Chiang became a member of the Tung Meng Hui, a revolutionary society started in Tokyo by Sun Yat-sen in 1905. It was a frankly radical society, socialistic in some respects, which sought to place China

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in a position of equality with the Great Powers. Later, on August [illegible], 1912, the Tung Meng Hui was united in a coalition with other revolutionary parties and became a part of the Kuomintang.

Upon his return to China in 1907, Chen attempted to establish a revolutionary newspaper in Hankow. He was arrested several times on suspicion but was released. Despite the failure of the enterprise, his revolutionary zeal remained unabated. He continued activities against the Manchu Government by such projects as supplying the revolutionaries at Canton with Ammunition during the abortive rising there.

Finally in 1911, Chen emerged as a full-fledged revolutionary leader of the "First Revolution", aided by his nephews, the Chen brothers.

While Chen was directing the movement against the Manchus in Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek returned to that city and the assistance offered by him to Chen was readily accepted. In a short time Chiang, who lived at the Chen house, became virtually Chen Chi-mei's Chief of Staff and together they worked out plans of attack upon the important Kiangnan arsenal at Shanghai.

Chen visited Hangchow, laid the groundwork for an uprising and was followed by Chiang who led a parallel attack to that directed by Chen in Shanghai on November 3, 1911.

With the capture of the arsenal by the revolutionaries and the recognition of the revolutionary flag, the chair of the Shanghai District hastened to avow itself revolutionary.

Chen became "General of the Military Government of the Chinese Republic", or Tutuh, and announced his appointment to the Municipal Council of the International Settlement, saying on November 9, 1911 , "Chi-mei, though incompetent, has been publicly elected by the military, students, soldiers and merchants to bear the responsibility of the duty of local reconstruction. Today I have begun duty."

Thus the revolutionaries of other provinces, that is the new military governors, showed their strength by forcing a meeting at Shanghai to conduct negotiations in the

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name of the new regime.

The revolutionary deeds of Chen and his followers may appear in large part sincere but it is reported by J.O.P. Bland in "Present Policies and Recent Events in China" that "at Shanghai the notorious corruption of the Military Governor Chen Chi-mei was reflected in the general demoralisation of his subordinates, in blackmail, extortion and oppression far worse than any abuses permitted by the Manchus."

Immediately, Chen began the training of troops to carry out the next stage of revolution. He also took a prominent part in organizing the outbreaks at Hankow, Wuchang on October 10, 1911, Soochow and Nanking, and in supplying funds and ammunition for the attack upon the latter.

In the succeeding year Sun Yat-sen and his following split with General Yuan Shih-kai, Provisional President of the Chinese Republic, because Sun wanted to do educational work and leave politics to a later stage, according to his revolutionary plan. Yuan persisted in playing politics. Chen resigned as Governor of Shanghai to follow Sun and continue revolutionary propagandising.

On July 20, 1913, Yuan set forth an edict saying that Chen, General Huang Hsing (see supplementary report) and Pe Wen-wei, Governor of Anhui Province, were dangerous rebels and were to be captured dead or alive. (Chen, on June 29, 1913, had already resigned the post of Minister of Commerce and Industry.)

Shortly after this, the "Second Revolution" broke out, lasting through July and August, 1913, with Chen again taking a major role.

On July 22, 1913, Chen gave the order for the declaration of independence of Shanghai. But the revolution did not succeed and the defenders of the same arsenal which figured in the first revolution were successful in driving off the revolutionaries.

Upon Chen's open declaration of his status as a revolutionary, he was deprived of all ranks on July 22 and exiled.

The failure of the "Second Revolution" necessitated

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withdrawal from China by the more prominent revolutionaries, including Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, Chen Chi-mei and Chiang Kai-shek. They left for exile in Japan in 1914 and there founded a new party known as the Chung Hua Ko Ming Tang, or Chinese Revolutionary Society, whose purpose was not only to overthrow the Manchus and establish a Republic of China, but also to nationalize the land and to work for cooperation between Japan and China. The membership was very small and did not include Wang Ching-wei and Huang Hsing who would not submit to what they felt to be Dr. Sun's arbitrary methods. Their places were taken by Chen Chi-mei and Hu Han-min.

Chiang, Chen and Tai Chi-tao were later sent to Dairen to establish revolutionary organs as Yuan, by Presidential Mandate, had the Kuomintang dissolved on January 10, 1914. Chen did not stay long in Dairen but returned to Shanghai with his followers Wu Chunghsin, Hsu Lang-hsi and Ting Ching-liang.

Chen's revolutionary activities led to a Presidential Mandate on July 15, 1914, giving orders to authorities to "execute everyone who took in payment notes circulated by Sun Yat-sen or those bearing the signature of Huang Hsing and Chen Chi-mei which are circulated especially among the troops to incite them against the Government."

Since the split in the party Chen, by carrying out such activities, had long been a thorn in the side of Yuan Shih-kai and was feared even more than Sun Yat-sen himself as Chen was known to be a man of violent action.

Yuan conceived a plot whereby false negotiations were started for funds, supposedly to be supplied by the Japanese, in support of revolutionary activities. In the course of secret meetings concerning this matter, Chen was assassinated by a hireling of Yuan on May 18, 1915.

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TOP SECRET

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Addressed to: Gen. Magruder	
Document date: 15 June 1944	Accession date: 15 June 1944
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2.		[signature]	6/15/44	6:30	RCB	6/15	6:30
3.		[signature]	15/6	6:05	[signature]	7/21	7:30
4.		[signature]	7/21	10:30	[illegible]	7/22	filed
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June 15, 1944

Dr. George W. Merck

Pres. Sargeant

Capt. Fleet stated this intelligence would be shown to the President
— S.P. Lovell

Captured documents from Japanese.

The first factual evidence that the Japanese are planning to use biological warfare and have also perfected a weapon has been discovered in the following two captured enemy documents. These are both notes of Japanese air cadets, evidently taken from the same lecture entitled presumably during their period of training.

[redacted]

JICPOA, Item No. 8430 dated 2 May 1944, Serial ATS-023945, extract from professional notebook of [redacted], Shinichi (class 26 collateral trainee); source unknown. This notebook contains a chart of aerial bombs describing external color and marking and suitable targets. Special bomb, Mark 7 (green purple, gray purple is listed as a medium bomb for special circumstances).

Confirming this document is another —

JICPOA, Item No. 1306 containing extracts from the professional notebook of [redacted], Akiraji, 1c. (j.g.). Navigator's Branch, 51st Class, Kurume-captured on Saipan, Attu. The document is dated 26 May 1943, Serial ATS-020926. This contains a list of bombs the main similar to the list in the previous document. In it appears again "Mark 7"...cities, water reservoirs, animals, personnel (bacilli). Example: "Air Assault (KUSSO) Type 13 experimental LBC, Mark 7."

A request has been made for production of Document No. 1 and a similar request will be made for production of Document No. 2. In conclusion it is noted that this is the first factual information of biological warfare from Japanese or derived from any other enemy power which has come to the attention of this office.

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Telephone: Hobart 1340

January 15, 1945.

General Wm. Donovan

With the compliments of

P.G. Henley

British Political Warfare Mission
British Embassy
Washington (8), D. C.

Dos and Donts for Broadcasters to Japan (2)
Dos and Donts for Broadcasters to Siam (2)

[Copy To MO
17 Jan 1945
Hall - Secretariat]

Deal

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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ANNEXE I.

POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE.

Far East Division, Ministry of Information.

GUIDANCE ON THE EASTERN POLITICAL WARFARE BROADCASTS.

DOS AND DONTS FOR BROADCASTERS TO JAPAN.

GENERAL NOTE.

To whom are you talking? To Japanese Government radio-monitors and Government officials to whom the monitoring reports are circulated, Japanese naval military and gendarmerie posts in Japan and scattered throughout East Asia, ship's radio operators, Japanese-speaking Chinese and a few civilian Japanese both in Japan and on the Asiatic continent who still have short-wave receivers.

What you have to say is therefore addressed, for the most part, to those already prepared to resist propaganda. Official monitors and officials, to whom monitoring reports are circulated, are used to dividing enemy propaganda from real facts (or what they consider to be real facts) in their minds. Monitored material, to have any effect upon them, must be unusually incisive and pithy; a striking phrase or some impressive figure might stick in their minds and might in consequence, influence their outlook or figure in their conversation.

Hard facts and vigorously presented news and comment would seem to be most suited to such an audience: commentaries should be written in an incisive and vigorous manner, containing many telling facts and phrases designed to stick in the mind. They should naturally be confined to topics likely to interest and interest their audience and their general tone must be dictated by the known psychology of the audience. The audience is one that has been educated to appreciate the virile, to despise the yielding and, it must be added, not to be impressed by the "fair". It is an audience that not only "understands" its own point of view, but which also believes in it and which will continue to believe in it even after many reverses.

Above all, therefore, commentaries should be "positive", they should avoid the "on the one hand and on the other" style and the "yes and no" reply. Commentaries should be concise, clear and to the point; they need not, and in fact usually do not, be long. To get across what you have to say be clear, pithy and positive in your expression, give worrying facts and figures and implant disturbing considerations in the Japanese mind by asking disturbing questions likely to provoke uncomfortable answers.

Therefore.....

HINTS

a) [illegible] Hints.

1) When you have nothing to say, repeat a telling script.
2) When you have nothing to say and have no suitable script to repeat, give a programme of good music or a talk on art, literature or religion, but see to it that you are uncompromisingly different and that what you give is of the very best; remember the Japanese which appreciates the acknowledged best.
3) When you hit upon a good slogan or a telling suggestive phrase, use it over and over again.
4) Be pithy and concise.
5) Use short sentences and simple phrases designed to stick in the mind.
6) When tempted to moralize, use the "question technique" - remember that what you say to your enemy can also be heard by your friend.

b) [illegible] Points.
1) Make a few basic
2) Make, where possible, the most use of [illegible] time and date of operation, since repetition [illegible] impresses the Japanese mind.

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ANNEX 2.

POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE

Far Eastern Division: Ministry of Information

GUIDANCE ON FAR EASTERN POLITICAL WARFARE BROADCASTS

DOS AND DONTS FOR BROADCASTERS TO SIAM.

The Audience:

Although it is to the Siamese that you are primarily talking, you will also be heard by Japanese and Chinese Government radio-monitors and by Siamese-speaking members of other South East Asian countries. While, therefore, it is important that the appeal should always be directed to the main target it is also important that nothing should be said to the Siamese that you do not want other nationals to hear.

So far as the Siamese themselves are concerned, the audience may be divided into three classes. There is a very small number of persons educated in Europe or America who have a good general knowledge of world affairs. The second class is composed of Government officials and traders (who are largely Chinese or of Chinese origin.) This group forms the bulk of our direct listeners. It consists of persons of all ranks of society, is very ignorant of everything outside Siam and needs an explanation of even the simplest matters. It is this class, however, which is highly susceptible to propaganda, for the persons comprised in it are addicted to discussion, listen eagerly to rumour and are ready to believe the worst of local politicians. The majority of the supporters of the 1932 Revolution are to be found in this category, and they were becoming conscious that the Constitution (by which they lay great store) had been abolished in all but name by Luang Pibul. The third and largest class is composed of indirect listeners, when the broadcasts reach by word of mouth. For this class anything in the nature of a nickname or "slogan" is useful.

DO's.

1. Be accurate.
2. Explain the significance of the news you give.
3. Relate European news to the situation in the Far East.
4. Be sparing of little-known place names.
5. When you hit upon a good slogan or telling phrase use it over and over again.
6. When quoting commentaries from other Governments always give your source.
7. Endeavour always to keep away from military objectives such as railways and installations.
8. Emphasise, by quoting imminent elimination of Germany from the War - and its implications, the hopelessness of Japan's position.
9. Quote "white fear" of Germany's satellites.
10. Blame the Japanese for all Siam's hardships and discomforts.

DONT's.

1. Do not set up too high a standard of moral courage for Siamese personalities.
2. Do not expect a high standard of general knowledge.
3. Do not attack the Siamese Government as a whole.
4. Do not refer to prominent Siamese who were known as our friends as traitors or quislings because they have not openly condemned the Japanese.
5. Do not endeavour prominent Siamese who were known as our friends by praising them for their past.
6. Do not comment on news of the new Government's activities.
7. Avoid wherever possible [illegible]
8. Do not discuss [illegible]
9. Never mention Luang Pibul's name.
10. Do not refer to Siam's future frontiers.

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ANNEXE I.

POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE.

Far East Division: Ministry of Information.

GUIDANCE ON FAR EASTERN POLITICAL WARFARE BROADCASTS.

DOS AND DONTS FOR BROADCASTERS TO JAPAN.

GENERAL NOTE.

To whom are you talking? To Japanese Government radio-monitors and Government officials to whom the monitoring reports are circulated, Japanese naval military and gendarmerie posts in Japan and scattered throughout East Asia, radio operators, Japanese-speaking Chinese and a few civilian Japanese both in Japan and on the Asiatic continent who still have short-wave receivers.

What you have to say is therefore addressed, for the most part, to those already prepared to resist propaganda. Official monitors and officials, to whom monitoring reports are circulated, are used to dividing enemy propaganda from real facts (or what they consider to be real facts) in their minds. Monitored material, to have any effect upon them, must be unusually incisive and pithy; a striking phrase or some impressive figure might stick in their minds and might in consequence, influence their outlook or figure in their conversation.

Hard facts and vigorously presented news and comment would seem to be best suited to such an audience; commentaries should be written in an incisive and vigorous manner, containing many telling facts and phrases designed to strike in the mind. They should naturally be confined to topics likely to interest and interest their audience and their general tone must be dictated by the known psychology of the audience. The audience is one that has been educated to appreciate the virile, to despise the yielding and, it must be said, not to be impressed by the "fair". It is an audience that not only "understands" its own point of view, but which also believes in it and which will continue to believe in it even after many reverses.

Above all, therefore, consideration should be "positive"; they should avoid the "on the one hand and on the other" style and the "yes and no" reply. Broadcasts should be concise, clear and to the point; they need not, and in fact should not, be long. To get across what you have to say be clear; pithy and positive in your expression, give varying facts and figures and implant [illegible] conditioning in the Japanese mind by asking disturbing questions likely to provoke uncomfortable answers.

Characteristics.

1. Do's.

a) General Guidance.

1) When you have nothing to say, repeat a telling script.
2) When you have nothing to say and have no suitable script to [illegible], give programs of good music or a talk on art, [illegible] but see to it that you are uncompromisingly [illegible] that you give in of the very best; remember the [illegible] to the acknowledged best.
3) [illegible] just such a good slogan or a telling suggestive [illegible] clear and to the point.
4) [illegible] simple phrases designed to stick in the [illegible].
5) [illegible] and the "question technique", [illegible] that you say to your enemy can also be heard by [illegible] friends.

b) [illegible]

1) [illegible] the event, time and date of operations, since [illegible] the Japanese mind.

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3) Explain the geographical position of places unfamiliar to the Japanese.
4) Give as much circumstantial evidence as possible, exact distances of towns from one another etc; use comparisons with well-known distances in Japan or the Far East.
5) See that your facts are fully documented.
6) Repeat your facts frequently, preferably using the same Japanese phrase each time.
7) Pick upon and demonstrate the fallacy of Japanese distortions of fact, avoiding sneering.
8) [illegible] NEWS
When treating European news, link it up as far as possible with the Far Eastern situation.
2) When treating bad news, present reverses factually and with dignity.
3) When treating good news, reiterate the facts simply and without exaggeration.
4) Exploit major strategic successes to the limit of instructions.
5) The Japanese militarists admire the German army; rub in any successes against the German High Command.
6) When treating production, concentrate on what is being produced now or has been produced already, giving exact figures where possible.
7) Give sometimes accounts of the British Home Front which, without unnecessary stress, reveal a contrast to conditions in Japan.
8) In Home Front Stories, plug British capacity to self-sacrifice.
9) When Japanese prisoners are taken, always say so, giving numbers only when these are spectacular.

A. DON'TS.

1) GENERAL BALANCE
1) Avoid hypocrisy.
2) Don't preach.
3) Don't adopt the tone of the Governess talking to her little charges.
4) Avoid the aggrieved air of the Governess at the ingratitude of her charges.
5) Don't indulge in truculence or stunts.
6) Don't moan.
7) Don't talk for the sake of talking; better a good programme of music than a bad talk.
8) Don't go on too long without some interlude.
9) Don't start a commentary with self-deprecation ("We know the British figure is not as good as it ought to be...but...");
fair silence will, except for the unfortunate monitors have switched off long before you get to your "but".
10) Don't be patronising about Japanese culture.
11) Don't assume that the Japanese know nothing about the West.
12) Don't give the Japanese hints about how we do things in wartime; don't give them any information that could be remotely useful to their war effort.
13) Don't belittle the bravery of the Japanese soldier, but avoid publishing instances of individual valour or the valour of some particular unit, since such circumstantial accounts are of use to Japanese propagandists.

2) [illegible] OF FACTS
1) Don't present minor or local successes as events likely to win the war or that have caused the 'tide to turn' etc.
2) Don't try to explain away reverses by references to terrain, weather etc.
3) Avoid obvious attempts to distract attention.
4) Avoid answering back; even bad news, unless continuous, loses its appealing effect; careful judgment is required to select a suitable moment for a counter-attack, which should not be related to our own reverse but should be aimed at enemy weakness.
5) Don't give particulars of individual Japanese prisoners of War.

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POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE

ANNEX 2.

Far Eastern Division: Ministry of Information

[illegible] JAPANESE POLITICAL WARFARE BROADCASTS

DOS AND DON'TS FOR BROADCASTERS TO SIAM.

The Audience:

[illegible] it is to the Siamese that you are primarily talking, you will also be heard by Japanese and Chinese Government radio-monitors and by Siamese-speaking members of other South East Asian countries. While, therefore, it is important that the broadcast should always be directed to the main target it is also important that nothing should be said to the audience that you do not want other nationals to hear.

As far as the Siamese themselves are concerned, the audience may be divided into three classes. There is a very small number of persons educated in Europe [illegible] a good general knowledge of world affairs. The second class consists of Government officials and traders (who are largely Chinese or of Chinese origin). This group forms the bulk of our direct listeners. It consists of persons of all grades of society, is very ignorant of everything but its own and needs an explanation of even the simplest matters. It is this class, however, which is highly susceptible to propaganda, for the persons comprised in it are addicted to discussion, listen eagerly to rumour and are ready to follow the words of local politicians. The majority of the supporters of the [illegible] are to be found in this category, and they were becoming conscious that the Constitution (by which they lay great store) had been abolished in all but name by Luang Pibul. The third and largest class is composed of indirect listeners, who the broadcasts reach by word of mouth. For this class anything in the nature of a nickname or "slogan" is useful.

Aim:

1. [illegible]
2. To explain the significance of the news you give.
3. To [illegible] Siamese opinion as to the situation in the Far East.
4. To [illegible] little known place names.
5. When you hit upon a good known or telling phrase use it over and over again.
6. When quoting communiques from other Governments always give your source.
7. [illegible] to advise to keep away from military objectives such as railways and installations.
8. To realise, by quoting imminent elimination of Germany from the War - and its implications, the hopelessness of Japan's position.
9. To note "anti-fascism" of Germany's satellites.
10. To blame the Japanese for all Siam's hardships and discomforts.

Don'ts.

1. Don't set up too high a standard of moral courage for Siamese personalities.
2. Don't expect a high standard of general knowledge.
3. Don't criticise the Siamese Government as a whole.
4. Don't refer to prominent Siamese who were known as our friends as agents or enablings because they have not openly condemned the Japanese.
5. Don't endeavour to eliminate Siamese who were known as our friends by pointing them out their past.
6. Don't [illegible] in praise of the pro-Government's activities.
7. Avoid personal abuse.
8. Don't [illegible] philosophy.
9. Never mention Luang Pradist Manudharm.
10. Do not refer to Siam's future frontiers.

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CC/S 3-34/4

General Donovan - File: Japan

We send herewith Letter Addressed to you which we received today from British Political Warfare Mission.

J. D. Nicholas

20/12/44

Cut 1

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: WM. L. LANGER

Even [illegible]

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Telephone: Hobart 1340

December 18, 1944.

General Wm. Donovan.

With the compliments of

F.G. Henley

British Political Warfare Mission
British Embassy
Washington (8), D. C.

Action Plan IV - 5.10.44

Even No. rolls

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x Japan
x Italy
x Anglo-American
x Satellite

[illegible] (Revised) COMMITTEE. 5.10.44.

OVERSEAS PLANNING COMMITTEE.

ACTION PLAN IV. PAPER NO. 530D.

[illegible] this war when events speak for us. The time is rapidly approaching when Japan will be utterly isolated and the full war resources of Britain and the U.S.A. can be turned on Japan. The situation has actively changed; Action Plan IV is designed to meet this change, and to supersede Action Plan III.

Action Plan IV operates within the framework of the Revised Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan, and must be read in connection with that document.

In the [illegible] new Psychol, it is no longer necessary to repeat the [illegible] guidance on the presentation of news which has appeared in former Action Plans, since it is now presumed to be in general use. For all questions of [illegible] interpretation, reference should be made to the Revised Joint Anglo-American Plan [illegible] to the "Guidance on Far Eastern Political Warfare Broadcasts", issued by the [illegible] Warfare (Japan) Committee.

1. AIM. The fundamental aim is Aim I of the Joint Anglo-American Plan:

Undermining the military, political, economic, social and psychological foundations of the Japanese war machine.

This has six principal aspects:

1. To intensify the rapidly-growing conviction among responsible Japanese leaders that Japan cannot win, and to instil this conviction in the minds of other Japanese at home and abroad.

2. To destroy the confidence of the Japanese people in their leaders.

3. To promote and intensify cleavages of opinion and sentiment among the various directing groups in Japan, e.g. the Army, Navy, Police, gendarmerie, industrialists, etc.

4. To create anxiety and depression among Japanese military and civilian personnel abroad.

5. To prove that the success of the democratic powers is due to their moral as well as to their material superiority, as the lack of success of totalitarianism is due to its moral as well as to its material inferiority.

6. To show that the Japanese cannot hope to cause dissension between Britain and the United States or to profit thereby.

(Note: this should be treated as an underlying assumption throughout, rather than the subject of special comment).

P.W.P.

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5. Oppression and occupation of Japanese police and gendarmerie.

6. The Japanese military and business cliques have utilised the position of the throne and exploited the loyalty of the people for their selfish ends.

7. The willingness of the Japanese people to bear hardships and sacrifices cannot avail against inept leadership and inferiority of man power.

8. Japanese leaders have diverted the energies of the nation away from peaceful economic development, which would have brought it prosperity and honour, into military adventures which have undermined the position of the Japanese Empire, and brought discredit on its name and hardship to its people.

Notes concerning the treatment of material under this head:

(a) For the treatment of the Emperor, see Appendix 'A'.

(b) No attempt should be made to identify the United Nations cause with that of the Japanese so-called 'liberals'. We should use the material available to reveal, intensify or promote cleavages without identifying ourselves with any of the cliques.

(c) The 'position technique' is particularly useful for these themes.

(d) Bear in mind that the Japanese are sensitive to how they stand in the eyes of the rest of the world; they were sustained in their sticking-ness by German example; when Germany is out of the picture, it is Allied opinion which must again count for them. Rub in, therefore, that where Japan is hated it is due to her militarism (which is anyhow unsuccessful), while where regard for her remains, it is due to her peacetime achievements (which were therefore successful).

Material addressed to Japanese military and civil personnel abroad.

1. Length of the war (including China hostilities) and of absence from Japan.

2. Japanese soldiers left to starve in isolated areas. Failure of Japanese Navy and Air Force to make adequate attempts to rescue or provision them.

3. Horrors of fevers, beri-beri, hunger, hostile surroundings, lack of medical supplies, trying climate.

4. Inducement to surrender. For this subject see Annex A to the Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan.

Notes concerning the treatment of material under this head:

The nostalgic, sentimental approach should be used; this must, however, be done with care, since exaggeration has the effect of beating morale.

P.W.B.

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MATERIAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

The propaganda material for implementing this aim and the aspects presented there can be classified as follows:

1. Material about the state of the war. Full use should be made of our improved position and prospects; since the facts are for us, we should concentrate on getting them across as forcibly and frequently as possible. The conclusions being now obvious, the audience should be allowed to draw them without tedious comment or would-be subtle interpretation. The chief lines are here stated for completeness:

   1. We are rapidly winning the war in Europe, and already we have begun the process of switching the full available power of our war machine on to defeating Japan.

   2. Already, even while fighting Germany, we have begun to defeat Japan. Show the implications of success of Allied strategy in the Far East so far, and recapitulate Japanese losses of territory. Reiterate that this has been achieved by the United Nations while they were still concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

   3. British and American production capacity will soon be fully available for the war against Japan. Japan has nothing to compare with it in quantity or quality.

   4. We are waging the war on a coherent, long-term strategic plan which will develop relentlessly and irresistibly.

   5. Our air superiority: defeat of Luftwaffe, devastation caused by bombing of military objectives in Germany; progress in long-range bombing which is already being made against Japan, and will be greatly extended.

   6. Our combined sea and air power enables us to make landings in enemy-occupied territory, as is shown by landings in Normandy, Riviera, etc., where our magnificent morale and resources have triumphed over all obstacles.

   7. Germany's satellites have deserted her; Germany will also desert Japan, which will be left without a friend.

   8. Japan's initial successes will not help her to save herself, any more than Germany's early victories helped Germany; the Japanese forces are widely scattered, and there is not enough shipping to reinforce them. Japan has not even the advantages which Germany derives from fighting on interior lines.

2. Material about the state of Japan. Material under this head is designed to create distrust of the Japanese leaders, and also to exploit Japan's home difficulties.

   1. Japanese leaders' error in choosing Germany and Italy as allies; their underestimate of British and American morale and material strength; the warnings they received on this point from other leaders whose views have been ignored.

   2. Japanese military and civil leaders' boasts that territory would never be taken from them.

   3. The so-called "Co-Prosperity Sphere" has not benefited the Japanese people but has enriched temporarily a few zaibatsu and senior officers.

   4. Unavoidable fear of certain Japanese leaders. These may be mentioned by name.

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5. [illegible] and corruption of Japanese police and gendarmerie.

6. The Japanese military and business cliques have utilised the position of the Throne and exploited the loyalty of the people for their selfish ends.

7. The willingness of the Japanese people to bear hardships and sacrifices cannot avail against inept leadership and inferiority of resources.

8. [illegible] diverted the energies of the nation away from peaceful economic development, which would have brought it prosperity and honour, into military adventures which have undermined the position of the Japanese Empire, and brought discredit on its name and hardship to its people.

Notes concerning the treatment of material under this head:

(a) For the treatment of the Emperor, see Appendix A.

(b) No attempt should be made to identify the United Nations cause with that of the Japanese so-called 'liberals'. We should use the material available to reveal, intensify or promote cleavages without identifying ourselves with any of the cliques.

(c) The 'question technique' is particularly useful for these themes.

(d) Bear in mind that the Japanese are sensitive to how they stand in the eyes of the rest of the world; they were sustained in their wickedness by German example; when Germany is out of the picture, it is Allied opinion which must again count for them. Rub in, therefore, that where Japan is hated it is due to her militarism (which is anyhow unsuccessful), while where regard for her remains, it is due to her peacetime achievements (which were therefore successful).

C. Material addressed to Japanese military and civil personnel abroad.

1. Length of the war (including China hostilities) and of absence from Japan.

2. Japanese soldiers left to starve in isolated areas. Failure of Japanese Navy and Air Force to make adequate attempts to rescue or prevention them.

3. Horrors of fevers, beriberi, hunger, hostile surroundings, lack of medical supplies, trying climate.

4. Inducement to surrender. For this subject see Annex A to the Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare against Japan.

Notes concerning the treatment of material under this head:

The neutral, sentimental approach should be used; this must, however, be done with care, since exaggeration has the effect of

P.W.B.

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3. Material on the sources of Allied strength. With the Japanese, more than with any other people, nothing succeeds like success; further, when convinced that a method succeeds, the Japanese usually adopt it. It is therefore our task to get across to them that we are not only materially but also morally superior. They are aware of our industrial superiority and are willing to emulate it - to our detriment, as long as they retain their primitive tribal outlook with its concomitant militarism. If they are, however, equally convinced of our moral superiority, they may capitulate, as the great advantage of the world, the partial revolution of 1868. If we can therefore show that our success is made possible by a view of life in which we really believe, it may make the Japanese more inclined to see the superiority of this to militarism, which is leading them to defeat. We should therefore suggest, both in presentation of news and in comment, that our success is due to our way of life, and not only to our superior material resources. The chief lines are (see note below):

1. Belief in the value and the rights of the individual, and in the sovereignty of the people; effect of this on national morale and the spirit of our fighting men.

2. Belief in independence of thought and free interchange of opinion; effect of this in promoting scientific invention and social progress.

3. Objective standards of right and wrong in international as well as national affairs; effect of these on the solidarity of the Anglo-U.S. alliance, firmly based on common principles of civilization.

4. The concept of justice, before which all are equal.

Notes concerning the treatment of material under this head:

(a) Selling democracy (or other preferred ideology) to the Japanese should be avoided. We should rather sell those basic ideas which have made democracy to develop. Were the Japanese to come to accept such ideas, they might then be in a position to create a Japanese equivalent of democracy to their taste, or at least a form of government compatible with world order. This is thought to be in every way preferable to and unrelated to the facade with which they face the world, while remaining basically unchanged within.

(b) That Anglo-American solidarity is a basic assumption throughout.

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POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE

OVERSEAS PLANNING COMMITTEE.

APPENDIX "A" TO ACTION PLAN IV
NOTE

This Appendix on the treatment in political warfare of the Emperor of Japan represents P.W.(J.)O.'s line of thought on the subject and is attached to Action Plan IV for your guidance and use when occasion should arise. No campaign is to be undertaken until special instructions are given.

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GUIDANCE ON THE TREATMENT IN POLITICAL WARFARE OF THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.

A. BACKGROUND

1. The Japanese conceive of their state as a pyramid, at the apex of which is the Emperor. The pyramid is itself composed of pyramidal stones; each stone represents a family group, and at its apex is the head of each family group. The cement which binds the whole together is loyalty: loyalty in the first instance to the head of the family, who represents the family, and then to the Emperor, who represents and sums up the Japanese race, and who is regarded not as an organ of the Japanese state, but as being the Japanese State itself.

2. The Japanese are acutely conscious of their long, unbroken and isolated history. They regard themselves as a unique phenomenon in the world and as being a race apart. To them the perpetuation of the race and the furtherance of its greater glory are the paramount aims of existence. Their race is summed up in the Emperor, who is the living representative of the Gods, of the heroes of the past and of the Japanese race in general.

3. On to this nucleus of feeling common to all Japanese have been grafted legends ascribing to the Emperor, to the Japanese race and to the very islands of Japan divine origins. Belief in these legends fostered for political and military considerations is obligatory on all Japanese. Mental reservations are undoubtedly made by many, but the great majority would be moved by the feelings outlined in paragraph 2. above.

4. Veneration attaches to the position of Emperor rather than to its occupant. The Emperor is held to be infallible; when policies succeed, the people are thought to be "following the will of the Emperor"; when they fail, the government have failed to carry out the will of the Emperor and must resign. In fact the Emperor is a symbol. He has little actual power. The rank rule of the country is achieved through a balance between the Japanese round the Throne, the High Command, the Privy Council, the Gunji Daijin-fu and the Elder Statesmen (now reanimated in the form of seven former Prime Ministers, the last in an advisory capacity). These bodies represent all shades of Japanese thought and frequent changes take place in their relative positions in order to maintain an equilibrium between them. While the High Command represents military reaction, these groups contain some ably-wise statesmen capable, if backed, of leading Japan along lines making for international co-operation, now they have been convinced by events that aggression has failed to serve its purpose.

5. Apart from the small underground communist party, there is no anti-Emperor movement in Japan. All that exists in this connection is a tendency among the non-military classes to criticise, privately, certain of the more unpalatable aspects of the war-party, which might lead internally from time to time. It is possible that this criticism may grow to overwhelming proportions as a result of the increasing victories of the Japanese Government, although, so far, there is no evidence of any

B. [illegible]

1. In the light of the above facts, two possibilities [illegible] for our political warfare: (a) to undermine the position of the Throne, around which the whole Japanese

/administrative

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280004-0

administrative machinery revolves, or (b) to turn its special position to our own ends. The first alternative involves several dangers: attacks on the Throne itself and on the person of the Emperor would almost certainly arouse the fundamental passions of the Japanese race, thereby perhaps making the task of defeating Japan more difficult. Attacks on the position of the Throne would certainly antagonise all the groups round the Throne who derive their power from the Throne and who in fact govern Japan. To set against these dangers our only assets would be the Communists and the inchoate scepticism of the non-military mentioned in paragraph above.

2. After weighing these possibilities, it has been decided that our policy is to take the second alternative, namely to exploit the special position of the Throne without either exploding or apotheosising it. Our immediate object, therefore, is to alter the equilibrium between the groups round the Throne in our own interests. This can best be achieved by doing everything in our power to discredit Japanese military and naval leaders and thus to weight the scale against the High Command, thereby strengthening the position of the other civilian groups. This may result in such groups putting into power governments composed of less fanatical and more worldly-wise persons capable of effecting in the long run even the transition from war to peace. In any case, it can be relied upon to reduce fighting morale. The leaders of the Japanese armed forces will naturally attempt to place the onus for their lack of success on to the civilians, in the manner successfully accomplished by the Germans after the last war; steps should be made to frustrate this.

3. GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONS.

The following is a standing directive for all treatment in publicity of the Emperor of Japan:

(a) Take his position for granted;

(b) Show appropriate but non-committal respect for the institution of the Throne;

(c) Do not mention him by his individual name;

(d) Refer to the Emperor in Japanese by the term which the Japanese themselves would use for us, namely Tenno Heika; abandon the term Tenno (Mikado), which the Japanese reserve exclusively for their own Emperor;

(e) When referring to the Throne in Japanese, use the formal verbs demanded by Japanese usage without exception;

(f) When referring to the Throne, do so in as serious a manner as possible, avoiding flippancy and condescension;

(g) Put all the blame for failure on the High Command;

(h) Show Japan's surrenders are due to the political position of the High Command in Japanese politics;

(i) Quote the Emperor's official pronouncements, serious and well-founded opinions (even from Japanese sources provided that there is no risk of [illegible] for authors) showing the building [illegible] or [illegible] reverence of the Emperor [illegible] mythology;

/ (j)

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(j) Quote, but not as official pronouncements, serious and well-founded expositions (even from Japanese sources provided that there is no risk of compromising the authors) of the military attempt to exert a stranglehold on the Throne by claiming themselves to be the quintessence of the Japanese way and the very embodiment of loyalty;

(k) Do not discuss what to do with the Emperor in a defeated Japan since this would give the Japanese hints as to how we propose to treat the imperial question, thereby enabling them to take countermeasures to frustrate our objective.

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FROM: [redacted]

TO: Colonel Smith

for information and return.

Lt. Col. Little

Lt Wittemore

Return To
Director's Office

(3384)

Even No. rolls

Expense is $25 Pf. 6.3

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280004-0

Telephone: Hobart 1340

August 29, 1944.

General Wm. Donovan.

With the compliments of
P.J. Healey.

British Political Warfare Mission
British Embassy
Washington (8), D.C.

Action Plan No. 1'I - Copy Nos: 2
Modification.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280004-0

POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE

OVERSEAS PLANNING COMMITTEE

SECRET

MODIFICATION TO PLAN OF POLITICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN: CHANNEL (PAPER 450B).

The following modification should be made to Paper 450B in the light of information received since it was prepared:

Page 2, section II (Broadcasting), para. 1 (d): substitute the following for the present paragraph:

(d) Australia: A 10 kw. transmitter has been functioning since December 1939: before the beginning of the Far East war it was known to be plainly received in Japan. Reports received since then show that it is still plainly received in Chungking and the Philippines.

A new 50 kw. transmitter at Melbourne came into operation on May 1, 1944, and is used for transmissions in Japanese, Chinese and English. Reports from Australia state that it is probably the loudest and most reliably receivable Allied voice in Japan and China: U.S.O. Pacific Intelligence however think it probable that San Francisco is better received in China and Japan. Its three broadcasts, Australia is concentrating on Japan as well as on English and vernacular transmissions to South-East Asia.

There is also an American programme to the Philippines, broadcast from the Australian 50 kw. transmitter. This is at present in English, but several vernaculars are also to be included.

The following particulars of the times of broadcasts are supplementary to those given in the Appendices:

U.S.F. 0730 - 0830	50 kwt.	Japanese
10.30 - 10.40 13.30 - 13.45 14.15 - 14.45	10 kwt. The 50 kw. transmitter has been added to the 10.30 transmissions	English
09.00 - 10.00	50 kwt.	American service to the Philippines in English.

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[JAPAN] COMM. TEE

OVERSEAS PLANNING COMMITTEE

MODIFICATION TO PLAN OF POLITICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN: CHANNELS (PAPER 4808).

SECRET

The following modification should be made to Paper 4803 in the light of information received since it was prepared:

Page 2, section II (Broadcasting), para. 1 (d): substitute the following for the present paragraph:

(d) Australia: A 10 kw. transmitter has been functioning since December 1941, before the beginning of the Far East war it was known to be plainly received in Japan. Reports received since then show that it is still plainly received in Chungking and the Philippines.

A new 50 kw. transmitter at Melbourne came into operation on May 1 1944, and is used for transmissions in Japanese, Chinese and English. Reports from Australia state that it is probably the loudest and most reliably receivable Allied voice in Japan and China. M.E.I.F. Pacific Intelligence however think it probable that San Francisco is better received in China and Japan. In these broadcasts, Australia is concentrating on Japan as well as on English and vernacular transmissions to South-East Asia.

There is also an American programme to the Philippines, broadcast from the Australian 50 kw. transmitter. This is at present in English, several vernaculars are also to be included.

The following particulars of the times of broadcasts are supplementary to those given in the Appendices:

G.M.T. 0730 - 0830 50 kwt. Japanese

10.30 - 10.50) 10 kwt. The 50 kw.
10.30 - 12.55) transmitter has been
14.15 - 14.45 added to the 14.30 transmission.

09.00 - 10.00 10 kwt. English

American service to the Philippines in English.

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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd HO .....

To	Room No.	Comments	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials
1. Lt Wm Jackson					
2. Col. Hanes					
3. Wm Pallot					
4. Mr. Smiber					
5. General Donovan					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

From the Files of the Director
Frank Rowlett

Staff officers making routine comments should initial or sign their remarks opposite their names. Comments of a derogatory or critical nature should be indicated by a check mark in the appropriate column. Routing sheet should always be returned to Chief, HO Section.

SECRET

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

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14,370

CCS 539/4

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 8, 1944

TO: Director, OSS

THROUGH: Deputy Director, SSO

SUBJECT: Joint Anglo-American Outline Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan, CCS 539/4

I - DISCUSSION

1. You handed to me the subject plan and Annex A entitled "Inducement to Surrender of Japanese Forces" for an opinion as to whether OSS operations are sufficiently covered.

2. The methods described in Paragraph IV of Annex A are, almost without exception, white and open. Our studies and field experience indicate that subversive techniques will be even more effective instruments in inducing surrender. (See attached comments on how pertinent paragraphs could be worded to include MO)

3. The MO Branch has interpreted the plan and methods as non-restrictive (see Colonel Mann's memo of June 12 to the Acting Director). This is a reasonable interpretation, although we do run the danger that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff will construe the described methods (subject to local adaptations) as exclusive, since it is expressly stated that this plan is mandatory.

4. Since, however, Colonel Mann advises that his memo interpreting the plan as non-exclusive has been presented to and approved by the Planning Group, which is an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we would appear to be reasonably protected.

II - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the draft of memo attached to Colonel Mann's memo of June 12 be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. That appropriate representatives of OSS further familiarize the Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners with the utility of MO techniques to the end that future plans or supplements thereto give proper emphasis to subversive as distinguished from open methods.

III - CONCURRENCE

1. Acting Chief, MO-FAC/PE
2. Chief, MO MAIA
3. Deputy Director, SSO

Area Operations Officer, MO-PE

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SECRET

June 18, 1944

COMMENTS RE "ANNEX A, INDUCEMENT TO SURRENDER OF JAPANESE FORCES" ATTACHED TO JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN OUTLINE PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN CCS 539/4.

The methods described in Paragraph 4 of the Annex are almost exclusively open and white.

Sub-paragraph 1 refers only to "our short-wave broadcast"

Sub-paragraph 2 refers to "our communiques".

The wording in other sub-paragraphs indicate that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were thinking primarily of open propaganda to Japanese troops and the homeland.

If the Annex were at some later date supplemented or amended I believe that OSS activities would be much better covered if the following paragraphs were worded as follows:

Paragraph III - Sub-paragraph 3:

"Aside from measures of strategical and tactical deception and the utilization of subversive and deceptive media which cannot be traced to their source, stick to the truth. An important objective of our psychological warfare is to establish the creditability of our statements and create distrust of their leaders' statements."

Paragraph IV - Sub-paragraph 1:

"Undermining the Japanese soldier's non-surrender attitude by questioning openly and subversively before Japanese public opinion and with the troops at the fronts, whether they will or should be disgraced by surrender, citing among other things historical precedents such as the return of prisoners following the Russo-Japanese War. Several methods should be used including open and subversive broadcasts, both on medium and short wave, the use of open and printed material and rumors."

Paragraph IV - Sub-paragraph 2:

"including in all official releases and through subversive and other methods references to the taking of Japanese prisoners, especially officers, without mentioning numbers unless they are significant. Omitting therefrom statements which imply recognition of the Japanese contention that no Japanese soldier surrenders."

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Paragraph IV - Sub-paragraph 4:

"Capitalizing on the effort which superiority of British and American weapons, overwhelming United Nations man power, shortages of Japanese shipping, lack of supplies including adequate medicines, food, etc., and other factors will have upon the Japanese soldier with the object of increasing the Japanese sense of inferiority in these respects. "

Paragraph IV - Sub-paragraph 5:

"As far as possible, induce surrender by raising doubts in the minds of Japanese troops and depressing their morale with all subversive and deceptive methods timed with military developments, to be followed up with appropriate questions, surrender passes or invitations to surrender, as may in any instance be suitable.

Paragraph IV - Sub-paragraph 8:

"I think it is important that the word 'regard' or some similar word be substituted for 'nostalgia' as the meaning is not clear in its present form."

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S E C R E T

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Dispatch No. .....

Date Rec'd. 5 A.....

Date	Recd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
			Please initial under I.T.I. "Concurrences".
			The memoranda attached, the second one for Colonel Burton's signature.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

June 12, 1944

TO: Acting Director, OSS

SUBJECT: Joint Anglo-American Outline Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan, CCS 539/4.

I - DISCUSSION

1. The subject plan (tab A) was submitted to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a memorandum from Col. Gridley, dated 23 May 1944, stating that it was furnished for information and file.

2. A subsequent memorandum to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, 24 May 1944, was received from Capt. Graves, Deputy Secretary, JCS, requesting implementation of the subject plan and annex, concerning "Inducement to Surrender of Japanese Forces", in close collaboration with United States and British agencies authorized to conduct psychological warfare and propaganda. The latter memorandum stated that the subject plan is being forwarded to Theater Commanders and to the Office of War Information.

3. The MO Branch of OSS interprets the subject plan as applying to its activities but not as restricting them.

4. In every way possible the MO Branch of OSS will implement the subject plan and annex in close coordination with other affected agencies. You are acquainted with the fact that the MO Branch is collaborating closely with the Office of War Information.

II - RECOMMENDATION

That the attached draft memorandum (tab B) be signed by the Acting Director, OSS, and transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

III - CONCURRENCES

1. Deputy Director, SSO Concurred. Reviews U.S. Aus Exec SSO.

2. Planning Group, per A.H. Onthank, Col., MC, Executive Officer, P.G.

K.D. Wenn, Lt. Col., AUS
Chief, MO Branch

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

June 12, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Joint Anglo-American Outline Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan, CCS 539/4.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of the subject plan and of Annex "A", entitled "Inducement to Surrender of Japanese Forces".

2. Pursuant to the request of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, conveyed in their memorandum to the Director of Strategic Services, dated 24 May 1944, appropriate action will be taken by the Office of Strategic Services to implement the subject plan and annex in close coordination with other affected agencies.

L. Edward Burton

C. Edward Burton, Acting Director
Office of Strategic Services

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DRAFT

2 August 1944 10:15 A.M. Conference with Dr. Lowden

1. Dr. Lowden and the Netherlands Minister called to re-establish relations between this office and the Dutch Government which were broken at the time we became OSS because the Dutch general advised Lowden that we were military agents.

2. Having re-established this relationship Dr. Lowden said he was deeply concerned over various reports and releases by OSS concerning the Nazi-Fascism of the Dutch Government. He said this arose partly through [illegible] of the Christian Socialist and Catholic parties, from which the Catholic later withdrew. However, he thought there was no basis for the report. He stated that a Mr. Ederwein of this office called on him to ask about these matters. General Donovan said to him this indicated that we wanted reports or face value but were checking with him to get his side of the story. He also mentioned that he did not like the attitude for trade by OWI and wondered whether it reflected this Government's attitude. General Donovan thought that the position of this Government, and particularly OSS was misrepresented; that we were, of course, dealing directly with resistance elements and that we had not obtained credit for the aid we were giving. General Donovan called Major Keller to ask him to look into the question of our aid to the Dutch Government, to see that we did get credit for what was being done and to check with OWI to find out the policy of its releases, and, if they were based on error, to see that the errors were corrected.

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DATE 1 Aug 1944

TO: BOB THRUN Asst G.C. Leg.

Some while ago you suggested that in its memos the Bd. of Review indicate which of the members approved the recommendation (e.g., that it was unanimous). This still is not being done and I recommend your sending a reminder to the Board.

J. E. D.

JED

Bob

Already in my file.

On occasion with [redacted] will [redacted] that he [redacted] Office of the General Counsel [redacted] Thing [redacted] of this [redacted]

Exon No. 11/5

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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Top ↑

To Japan

Telephone Hobart 1340

June 19, 1944.

General Wm. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

With the compliments of

P.G. Healey.

British Political Warfare Mission
British Embassy
Washington, D. C.

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FROM: British Political Warfare Mission, Washington.

RE: Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan.

Kindly re-classify the above document sent you by us and marked "Top Secret", as "Secret", in accordance with Combined Chiefs of Staff's notation.

June 19, 1944.

F.G. Healey.

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indicate the edges of
camouflage field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f/6.3

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280004-0

SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mrs. O'Connell

DATE: 12 June 1944

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT : Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan

I talked today by telephone to Mr. Mealey of British PW Mission and pointed out that whereas the attached paper is classified Top Secret, we had previously received the identical plan as JIS 539/4 classified only Secret.

Mr. Mealey said he would take this matter up with London. In the meanwhile he thought it would be all right to treat it as Secret. Please keep a copy of this memorandum attached to both copies of the paper.

D. C. L.

SECRET

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[illegible] field

Even No. rolls!
[illegible] is 1/25 of f.6.3

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SECRET

12 June 1944

Mrs. O'Donnell

Secretariat

Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan

I talked today by telephone to Mr. Healey of British PW Division and pointed out that whereas the attached paper is classified Top Secret, we had previously received the identical plan as JCS 599/4 classified only Secret.

Mr. Healey said he would take this matter up with London. In the meanwhile he thought it would be all right to treat it as Secret. Please keep a copy of this memorandum attached to both copies of the paper.

D. C. L.

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This paper is identical with CCS 530/4 except for the classification which is secret.

[redacted]

[illegible] edges of green [illegible] the edges of [illegible] field

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280004-0

Telephone: Hobart 1340

June 8, 1944.

General Wm. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

With the compliments of

P.J. Healey.

British Political Warfare Mission
British Embassy
Washington, D. C.

Copy Nos. 11 and 12 of Joint Anglo-American Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan.

Copy 12 [illegible] to Lt. Col. Faeth

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280004-0

CCS 537/4

(F 2548/22/G)

TOP SECRET

JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN.

(Note: This document has the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and is mandatory forthwith on all British and American agencies conducting political warfare against Japan).

I. PURPOSE

To contribute to the defeat of Japan by pursuing the following objectives:

A. Undermining the military, political, economic, social and psychological foundations of the Japanese war machine.

B. Encouraging resistance of all kinds by peoples whose territories are occupied or threatened by Japan.

C. Promoting dissention between Japan and Germany.

D. Destroying the confidence of neutrals and Axis satellites in Japan. (Term: "neutrals" not to include U.S.S.R.).

II. OBJECTIVES

A. "Undermining the military, political, economic, social and psychological foundations of the Japanese war machine."

1. Military

a. To lessen the fighting will and induce the surrender of the Japanese armed forces (individually or en masse); to destroy their confidence in their leadership; to depress and confuse them wherever they are.

(Note: An ancillary paper on inducement to surrender is attached hereto as Annex).

b. To create friction between the Japanese Army and Navy, and between different arms, services, ranks, cliques and loyalties.

c. When and as directed by the appropriate military authority:

(i) to create special conditions real or feigned which will force the Japanese to disperse or immobilise their forces;

(ii) to create conditions real or feigned which will increase administrative and logistic strain on Japanese occupying forces.

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d. To create friction between Japanese Forces and puppet troops and to sharpen the distrust and dislike of each for the other.

2. Political

a. To create doubt, confusion and defeatism among both the armed forces and the civil population of Japan by undermining confidence in the government and its foreign, domestic and military policies.

b. To create among the people and forces of Japan a distrust of their present government by stressing the failure of the policies of that régime.

(Note: For the time being, all attacks or reflections on the Imperial family must be avoided).

c. To encourage divisions and conflicts among Japanese political groups, administrative bodies, and the central and local governments (particularly those of possessions and occupied territories).

d. To instigate, promote and foster suspicions, animosities, and conflicts between the Japanese Government (central and provincial) and its political organs, on the one hand, and those of puppet governments and native authorities under Japanese control on the other.

e. To align popular economic and military power behind such Japanese and Japanese-puppet schisms as may exist or may be created by Paragraphs c and d next above.

f. To increase the burden on Japanese and puppet administrative political machinery at home and abroad.

3. [redacted]

a. To increase the strain on Japan's external communications and transportation.

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b. To increase consumption, hoarding, dispersion and wastage of Japan's resources.

c. To effect adversely Japanese production, particularly in petroleum refining, shipbuilding and aircraft industries.

d. To confuse and depress Japanese monetary and credit systems at home, in occupied territories and in areas adjacent thereto.

e. To undermine the economic, fiscal and monetary bases of Japanese puppet governments and local authorities in occupied territories who are subservient to Japan.

f. To hamper or destroy Japan's economic relations with her allies and neutrals.

4. Social and Psychological.

a. To create general despondency and even terror.

b. To depress and confuse the people of Japan by fostering and exploiting their economic and social class distinctions.

c. To emphasize the "unity and fighting spirit" of the Allies.

d. To impress upon Japanese civilians and military our superiority in war potentials.

e. To take full advantage of the Japanese susceptibility to a war of nerves by creating doubt and fears about the future; to emphasize that each day and each victory in Europe brings closer the time when the full weight of United States and Britain will be thrown against Japan.

f. To encourage Japanese defeatism and create a desire for peace by: quickening the consciousness of and arousing resentment against the hardships of the war; emphasizing that Japan has long since lost the initiative and is increasingly on the defensive; re-iterating the hopelessness of victory.

5. Encouraging resistance of all kinds by peoples whose territories are occupied or threatened by Japan.

a. To instill among occupied peoples the conviction that Japan's sole interest and aim in their territories are exploitation of the natural and human resources therein for the sole benefit of Japan.

b. To give constant encouragement to all occupied peoples to avoid cooperation with Japan by emphasis on Japan's weaknesses, the unity and increasing strength of all her enemies, and the inevitability of her defeat within a reasonable time.

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e. In coordination with Allied military plans:

I. To instruct occupied peoples in the best techniques of individual and group resistance and sabotage.

II. To stimulate and direct passive and active military and economic resistance (including sabotage) by the people and guerilla forces of all territories occupied by Japan.

III. To promote and guide nationalist and independence agitation in Korea.

d. To discourage non-Japanese workers from going to or working for Japan.

e. To assure occupied peoples resisting or willing to resist the Japanese that the Allies will give them all the material support that circumstances make possible.

f. To instill the conviction among occupied peoples that their puppet governments and troops and all who collaborate with Japan are their enemies; to encourage those peoples to undermine all puppet and collaborationist elements and forces.

(Note: Implementation of this objective should be subject to the special circumstances of each target area).

g. To give full acknowledgment to the contributions of occupied peoples to the war against Japan.

h. To explain and exploit to occupied peoples the inherent conflict between Japanese social, political and religious concepts and those of the rest of the Far East.

C. Promoting dissention between Japan and Germany.

a. To undermine Japanese confidence in and promote distrust of Germany.

b. To emphasize and exploit the inherent conflict of political interests and ideologies between them.

c. To hamper economic relations and provoke or exploit economic rivalry between Japan and Germany.

d. To emphasize to Japan the weaknesses, reverses and inevitable defeat of her European partner.

e. To promote the cessation of espionage by Germans.

f. To evidence German willingness to abandon Japan if she could thereby save herself.

D. Destroying the confidence of neutrals and Axis satellites in Japan.

(Note: The term "neutrals" does not include U.S.S.R. for the purposes of this section).

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a. To create distrust of, lack of confidence in and disrespect for Japan among neutrals and Axis satellites.

b. To emphasize and exploit the inherent conflict of political interests and ideologies between them.

c. To hamper economic relations and provoke or exploit economic rivalry between Japan and Axis satellites.

d. To emphasize to neutrals and Axis satellites the weaknesses, reverses and inevitable defeat of Japan.

e. To promote among neutrals and Axis satellites the suspicion of Japanese espionage; and among the Japanese, the suspicion of satellite espionage.

f. To evidence Japanese willingness to abandon her satellites if she could thereby save herself.

g. To promote among neutrals and Axis satellites lack of faith in Japan's promises and commitments.

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TOP SECRET.

ANNEX "A"

INDUCEMENT TO SURRENDER OF JAPANESE FORCES.

(Note: This document has the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and is mandatory forthwith on all British and American agencies conducting political warfare against Japan).

I. PURPOSE

To contribute to the defeat of Japan by inducing the surrender of Japanese armed forces (individually or en masse).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Unfavourable Factors.

The reluctance of the Japanese fighting man to surrender is attributable to the following:

1. Every Japanese soldier undergoes intensive indoctrination with respect to the Nation's unique military traditions, the special destiny of Japan under the divine guidance of the Emperor, and the heritage of glory to be won by giving his life for the Emperor.

2. The Japanese are taught that their military record is one of unbroken victories, due primarily to their "spiritual superiority."

3. Loyalty unto death is inherent in the samurai's code, which is alleged to stand in marked contrast to the decadent characteristics of their enemies.

4. The Japanese do not attach the same values to life and death as we do. To die on the field of battle is to be enshrined as a national hero. Surrender is stigmatized as worse than death, a disgrace to the soldier, his family and his community. Should he surrender and later return to his country, the Japanese soldier believes that he would be ostracized by his family and community.

5. The Japanese high command has played skillfully upon fear of the unknown and the unfamiliar which would confront the soldier should he surrender. He is told (and largely believes) that if captured, he would eventually be tortured and killed.

6. Because of the foregoing military indoctrination, the Japanese fighting man goes to the front fully prepared to die in battle.

7. The Japanese have a strongly developed herd instinct and the indoctrination to which they are subjected from childhood sets rigid social patterns from

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from which they are loath to depart.

8. In the early part of the war our own troops took few prisoners. Evidence of the refusal of our troops to accept their surrender has reached the Japanese who believe that offers to surrender will not be accepted.

9. Much of the comment in our press and in radio broadcasts gives the Japanese the impression that our main war objective is to exterminate the Japanese as a race and as a nation.

B. Favourable Factors.

Factors which serve to counteract the foregoing and overcome reluctance to surrender are:

1. Despite his indoctrination, the regimented fighting man of Japan is fundamentally human and has the primary instincts of self-preservation and the desire to live a normal life.

2. The Japanese fighting man loves the physical charm of his country and has an intense devotion to his family and the village community; when separated from these attachments he suffers an intense nostalgia.

3. Defeat in battle should have a deteriorating effect upon Japanese military morale, which should be followed by a greater willingness to surrender.

4. The Japanese are by nature volatile and of short enthusiasms; their war spirit and morale must be constantly revived.

5. The Japanese are vulnerable to external propaganda, as evidenced by the extreme efforts of the government to preserve them from this polluting influence.

6. The Japanese, even those in the armed forces, are by no means united.

III. PRECIS

1. Our efforts to induce surrender should be an aspect of the general softening process that can be pursued at all stages of the war and in all phases of psychological warfare.

2. A particular short range campaign must fit within the general framework of psychological warfare aims, the major themes of which are; (a) "Our victory (or your defeat) is certain", (b) "your military leaders (at home and in the field) have let you down. Coordination is essential to avert the danger of long range propaganda taking a different line from short range propaganda - thus defeating both.

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3. Aside from measures of strategical and tactical deception and the circulation of depressing rumours which cannot be traced to their source, stick to the truth. An important objective of our psychological warfare is to establish the creditability of our statements and create distrust of their leaders' statements.

4. Never question the bravery of the Japanese soldier but adopt a sympathetic attitude towards his hardships.

5. In direct propaganda to Japanese forces, avoid the use of the word "surrender" (kosan, kofuku) or other words which the Japanese associate with dishonour. In general, avoid the direct suggestion that it is easier or better to live than to die.

6. Always evidence our determination to win by fighting if necessary. While not encouraging the Japanese fighting man to accept death, the primary and constant accompaniment to the alternative must be "If you want death, we have it."

7. Avoid telling the prospective captive that he will be returned after the war to Japan. Because of his indoctrination this prospect may alarm him.

8. Do not release names of Japanese prisoners of war or photographs in which features of individual prisoners are clearly identifiable. (Group photographs, in which individual features are not clearly identifiable, may be used).

IV. METHODS

When used locally the following should be adapted to suit local circumstances and necessities.

1. Undermining the Japanese soldier's non-surrender attitude by forcing Japanese public discussion of surrender of their troops. To this end the matter should be discussed in our shortwave broadcasts to all parts of the world.

2. Including in our communiqués every possible reference to the taking of Japanese prisoners, without mentioning numbers unless they are significant. Omitting therefrom statements which imply recognition of the Japanese contention that no Japanese soldier surrenders.

3. Utilizing any evidence, particularly from Japanese sources, that gives the lie to Japanese communiqués, with the object of shaking the faith of the fighting men in their leaders.

4. Capitalizing on the respect with which the Japanese soldier regards the tenacity of the British and American fighting men and the superiority of his weapons, with the object of increasing the Japanese sense of inferiority in these respects.

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5. As far as possible, presenting surrender propaganda by means of simple questions, so phrased that they suggest the answers we want.

6. Emphasizing that Japan is losing the war -- not merely the present battle.

7. Suggesting to enemy forces in a tight situation that, rather than "Surrender", they come over and join their comrades as the best way out of their hopeless predicament. Emphasizing that to fight when conditions are beyond prospect of relief and there is no hope of victory is a foolish policy. Suggesting that the Japanese soldier has done all he can and that he will be needed when the war is over.

8. Encouraging in the Japanese fighting man his inherent nostalgia for his family and homeland, referring, when intelligence makes it possible, to his or his unit's home district for local colour. His loneliness and home-sickness should be stressed at every opportunity with the implication (particularly applicable in the case of forces cut off or isolated) that the fighting man is unsupported or forgotten.

9. Removing Japanese fear of the consequences of surrender by stressing the good treatment he will receive and assuring him that he will be among his comrades.

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